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OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST.”
$July 1961
The general purpose of this thesis is to derelop som
of the notions of Ludwig Wittgenstein whioh are oonoerned
with language* In order to mace his ideas clear, 1 present
a hietorioaX haoliground for the ideas with whioh he deals.
Thus, the Tiews of Plato, Leihnis, Looke, and Ruesell, point
out the nature of the prohleae surrounding the relation be-
tween language and reality. The second chapter seeks to
demonstrate, howewer briefly, several of the ways philosophers
have tried to resolve the problems that aooompany this rela-
tion; and, at the same time, to show how none of their solu-
tions are adequate. Proceeding from this baokdrop of expo-
sition, X attempt to indicate, with some degree of clarity,
how Wittgenstein surveys the problematic oonneotion between
Icuiguage and reality. I shall oonolude that there is actually
no connection between language and reality. Therefore, the
very object of this thesis is to illustrate that there is
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Ptrbapa If idaaa and words were distinctly
wslgbtd and duly oonsidarsd, they would
afford us anotbsr sort of logic and oritio
than wbat ws baws bitbsrto boon acquainted
with.
John Looka, An Saaay ooooern^
Human Underetandtng.
Ohapt«r I
L4iaUA02 AKB RKaLITYi FOUR TICW8
This first chapter explains bow four philosophers
treat the relation between language and reality. The ao-
oounts of how they deal with this relation shall be brief,
mainly because they only serwe to illustrate the wiewe of
Ludwig Wittgenstein which shall occupy later chapters. More-
over, their four viewe are arranged aooording to the two,
general, philosophic approaches they seen indicative ofi
Plato (A) and Leibnis (B), an idealist approach; Locke (C)
and Russell (0), an eapirioist approach. By * idealist* I
mean a philosophic conception maintaining that reason alone
provides substantial knowledge concerning the nature of the
world; and by * empiricist* I mean a philosophic doctrine
BMiintaining that substantial knowledge oonoeming the nature
of the world is derived from experience, i.e. from the senses.
Both of these become more explicit as the chapter proceeds.
Furthermore, it is believed that the historical situation of
each philosopher allows the four views to be rendered without
confusion; and that the presentation of these views is such
that the latter in each approach exhibits the greatest develop-
ment. Finally, 1 have found it necessary to hurry over, and
at tistes ignore, some of the main tenets of these philosophers,
in order to: (i) be brief; (ii) prevent drifting from the
point; (iii) present the best oase for each philosopher.
( 1 )
Plato. ->«»To understand tbs oonnsotlon Ostvssn lan^piags
and reality In the works of Plato, I shall oonoentrate on the
relation of languaige to *esstnoe*.l How language relates to
'essenoe* appears, aaong other places. In the Sophist, the
Phaedo. and the reasonably authentio seventh
I.Qistls,.^ I now proceed with an exposition of Plato* s posi-
tion, taken mainly from the Seventh Kpistle. but which has
the support of referenoes from several other Platon io texts.
"£very existing object has three things whioh are the
neoessary means by whioh knowledge of that object is acquired.
C i) The object has a name. This name (a sensual intimation
of an essence)^ is either a noun or a verb,^ e.g. the nouns
(subjects) 'circle* or 'beauty* and the verbs (actions) * sleep*
or 'eat*, (il) The object has a definition, for example,
the object with the name 'circle* might have the definition
"that whioh is everywhere equidistant from the extremities
to the center*;^ and definitions themselves are "composed of
nouna^and verbs."^ (ill) The objeot also has a "sensory oopy"^
or image whioh resides, after the objeot is perceived, in the
mind (soul) of the peroeiver. This is to make clear that a
person has an image of the objeot in his mind, and not the
objeot itself. It then seems to follow, on Plato* s view,
that * knowledge of that object*® is possible in virtue of
the intricate oombination of those three things whioh the
object has.^^ The name, the definition, and the image combine
to form what Plato ©alls knowledge.
( 3 )
Plato also oookt to astabllsh ths •xlstanttal ohar-
aoter of knowlodga by saying that it "dosa not axUt in tho
ooal utteranoee or in bodily foraa but in tha aoul.«^3 Thua,
knowladga of tha oirola« for axaapla, diffars, both from tha
natura of tha oiroXa, i.a* ita asaanoa, and from tha objeot,
whioh ia aanead* This ia what I an raoogniaing aa an idaaliat
approaoh» wharain tha objaota of ooamon axparianoa are Icnown
aa mantal iaiagaa. rurthermora , on this Tiaw, tha Talidity
of thaaa iaagaa» aa they rapreaent piaoee of knowladga, ia
not daterainad by tha faot that thay ara lanadiataly praaantad
to tha mind by axparianoa, but rather is datarminad by what
thay are nadiataXy an axpreaaion for. Plato wants to aaintain
that tha inagas (whioh ara *expra8sions of tha aind in apaaoh*)^^
ara expressions of, i.a. planipotantiaries for, their reapaotlTS
essanoes.^^ Ssaanoas *ara, as it wars, patterns fixed in
nature** and of particular interest hare is tha word 'pattern.*
For, if assenoas ara patterns in natura, than tha relation
ioiage to assanoa oan be oonstrued as struotural, and not neo-
assarily as tha relation of a piotura to that which is pictured.
It is Plato's idea that the assenoas play an inportant
role in datarnining tha truth of thair raspaotiva inagas. They
do this in two ways, (i) Kssenoes prorida the conditions for
the exiatenoa of inagas; and thus, for knowledge itself.^®
(ii) Thay also detarnine the truth or falsity of an image by
a formal relation, which Plato calls 'participation*.^^ Ha
oharacterises essence (being) as; in space iasiutable, in
( 3 )
tlM absolut*.^^ Therefore » kaowl«dg« •of all wfaioh w ttaap
with tba naaa of •aaonoo in tbo dialtotioal prooott*^^ la
acquired *before we are bom, *30 so Plato oontenda; and after
/
birth, bp the prooeaa of reoollootion, knowledge of eaaenoea
ia proBpted, though not werif led, b/ the aenaea.^^
The Platonic connection between language and true reality,
i.e. eeaenoea, ia twofold, (i) On the one hand, words (the
aenauoua aigna of mental iauiges) express their referent es-
senoea;^^ and as a result of this, they ocui proaulge knowledge.
Kowewer, because of the ephemeral natiire of words, 33 they do
not establiah knowledge, in the sense of eatablishing the
truth walue of particular propositions. The truth value claim
of knowledge ia a function of that forauil relation, perhaps
an ieoBorphisii, exiatlng between the mental image and its ea>
eenoe, i.e. a relation of participation, (ii) On the other
hand, words, in either their written or vooal fora,^^ are the
only aeana whereby aasenoes oan be known. Only as the eaaenoea
are represented in language oaoi they be known, with this quali-
fication: though language signifies the eaaenoea, it also oan
easily lead to ambiguities, for it effects the senses of dif-
ferent HMn in various ways. In this oonneotion, Plato mentions
that "the etream of thought which flows through the lipe and
is audible is called epeeoh.*35 However, what language rep-
resents—essence or reality—remains the same in the percep-
tions of all Bsn; it is the degree of participation which
varies, and not ths aprioristio character of the essences.
( 4 )
T)i0r«fore» X oonoXuda^ that knowledge, onoe obtained, Iw iden-
tloal fron nan to nan; and le a funotlon of worde, whioh la
to aaT*-ldealIy, knowledge is oonweyed in the oomneroe of
dieoouree.
In eufittary, the main points found in Plato are three*
They aret (1) the degree to whioh reality ie known ie a func-
tion of the fornal relation between words in ooabination,^®
and those eseenoes whioh they express; (ii) language is a
sensuous si^n whioh expresses reality: and finally (iii), lan-
guage and thought nay, ideally, be oonsldered the saae.^^
(B) Le ibi^is .—Bas ioally > Leibnis proposed what he oaaied a
Qharaoteristlca mUl ^ »prifliitiwe ideas* were to be
represented by eyabols, after the example of aatheaatioa.^^
in sone respeot, howewer, the linguistio oontributions of
Leibnis are derived from certain Platonio notions*^^ There-
fore, in what follows, I shall first point out (1) the Platonio
presuppositions upon whioh Leibnis* position seems to depend,
and then (2), give an aooount of how X beliewe language and
reality are related in the works of Leibnis*
(1) Plato and Leibnis *-^The Platonio notions whioh appear
to have influenced Leibnis are the following. ( i) The a priori
nature of Plato's essenoes, a neoeesary oondition for the
Inter-eubjeotivity of knowledge, appears in Leibnis as that
universal, unitary principle of knowledge, whioh he termed the
8 ftp lent ia humana ; and which is the claim that knowledge alwaye
( 6 )
rtnalns on« and the eaaie fro* oan to man. (11) Lelbnlt le
In complete aooord with Plato In regard^ to the superior power
of reason, also oontraetlng Its certainty with that of the
31
eensea. Howewer, (111) where Plato must make a logical dis-
tinction between the immutable and transcendent eseenoes,
32
and their expression wia some ephemeral representation, Lelbnlt
finds this an unneoessary distinction. He assumes that the
reason already contains the eseenoes (what he calls *prlmltlwe
Ideas*) In their pure form; and that they only await tbs proper
symbol Isat Ion In an adequate calculus to fill out the
texigUoa Unlyersalii. And finally (Iv), the forms of the
33
Lelbnltlan * Ideas,* l.e. Plato's essenoes, are expressible
In, are represented by, the forms of language, muoh ae they
were In Plato. Therefore, hawing now pointed out these
parallels, 1 bellewe that a detailed study, mors than spaoe
presently allows, would show that the seeds of many Lelbnlslan
notions were first oultlwated In Oreo Ian soil soms 3000 years
prior to his birth.
(a) Laibnln iMtauMt. Md Jr.*Uto.—Ulbnl* wa*
by the mathematloal dewelopments In his day to propose ^making
use as auithematlolans do, of characters, which are appropriate
to fix our Ideas, and of adding to them a numerical proof.*
There are two thoughts here; (1) that Ideas be represented
by oharaotere of symbols, and (11) that of providing a oalovuub
rat looinator . a dewloe for *numerloal proof*. I will consider
eaob In turn, In so far as they display the manner In which
( 6 )
X««ibnls ralatot language to reality.
(^) MiAS and otinraotera.—»Leibnig regards language aainly
aa a vehiole for thought; and in ooneequenoe of thle, language
la Inatpoaental in hie logical analyaia of ideas.® Thue, onoe
ideaa are reduced to their siapleat forBa» i.e. to priaitiTe
ideaa» and aaaooiated with epeoified aynbole, the ayabola are
faahioned into the Charaoteriatioa Onireraalia . Theoretically,
these symbols would "reduoe all questions to numbers, ^r%A thus
present a sort of statics by Tirtue of whioh rational evidenoe
37
may be weighed.** In this manner, Iraowledge, whioh is now
symbolised, set in a oaloulus, and propositionally related to
the clear and distinct primitiwe ideas, can be quantitated,
making knowledge amenable to that same kind of manipulation
particular to weighing and measuring. Thus, having reduced
"reasoning in ethics, physios, medicine, or metaphysics to
these terms or oharactsrs , " and having a oorrsoted language
whioh resembles the preoiseii^ess of a mathematical oaloulus,
”we shall be able to introduce the numerical test in such a
39
way that it will be impossible to make a mistake •** Here,
then, the ideal language for Leibnie would perfectly represent
An
and express rsality, Isavlng no grounds for philosophic con-
troversies. "If controversies were to arise, there would be
no more need for disputation between two philosophers than
between two accountants. For it would suffice to take their
pencils in their hands, to sit down to their slates, and to




(11) Tfct oaloulm r>tlooln>tor—In bli azloMtlo pro«ruM
Leibnit tries "to reduce traditional form ot eyllogietio
and inaediate inference to eonething like an algebraic oal-
oulus*"^^ By this reduction he hopes to establish the "tvo
first principles of all reasoning, the principle of contra^
43
diction. . .and the principle that a reason oust be giren,"
the latter being known as the principle of sufficient reason.
These two fundamental laws of thought are the basis of Leibnii*
logical oaloulus.^^ This oaloulus laid down the formal rules
aooording to which, in a reduotiTS analysis of oomplex ideas,
the moat primitire ideas are ultimately arrired at. In con-
sequenoe of its application one arriTca at a distinot, clear
aft
' idea' , whioh, under the ideal conditions of a complete,
reduotire analysis, is represented by its proper oharaoter.
That oharaoter completely expresses the 'idea*, and as the
priaitire idea is a part of reality, language completely ex-
presses, what it expresses, i.e. reality. In other words,
if ideal oonditions obtained, laxiguage would perfectly mirror
reality. Therefore, Leibnis held that on his Tiew the formal
aspect of the Character isUca UnlyerealM perfectly expressed
or represented the form of reality—in reason, an "alphabet
of thought".
Summarising then, there are fire major points whioh
Leibnis sesme to maintain. They are: (i) that ideas oan he
completely represented by ideograms (oharaoters) whioh would
constitute the Charaoterietica Universalia. and (ii) the logic
(8)
of thl« oaloulus 0ot 8 out the laws of thought after the ex-
ample of aathematloal prooeeeee, proTidlng a fremevork from
which all poeelble knowledge could oonoeiwahly be deriwed,
and (ill) by whloh preeent knowledge ie testable; (iw) einoe
thought and language (ideally) are one, the laws of thought
expreas, In the Unlyeraalia. the actual form
of reality; and finally (w), and as a result of (iv) certain
knowledge of reality ie poaaible in the Uharaoteriatioa Uni-
(0) Lookif .^The wiewe of John hooks represent the first of
the two empiric iata, the other being Russell. In looking at
Looks* a poaition, and eapeoially for pertinent remarks on
the languime-reality relation, one fails to find any explioit
reference to this relation. Howewer, it is implicitly indi-
cated in those three aspects of Locke* s philosophy shown below.
They aret (1) the nature of knowledge; (2) language and knowl-
edge; and (3) reality*
(1) The natur* of knowHdg*—took, hoia* that the alnd of
a new-born child oan be likened to that of a blank piece of
48
white paper *woid of all oharaoters, without any ideas. ** That
material which gradually furnishes the mind, i.e. the oonstit-
49
uents of the understanding, oome from «*i;xparianoa.« Tula
is what I am recognising as the empiric 1st approach, in which
fon* fii. origQ of all knowledge is
experience. Looks dia-
tinguiehee two reepeota in whioh • Experience* furnishee the
( 9 )
understanding with watwrialai (i) by sensations (ideas re-
sulting froB sense inprsssions) , which are "the great souroe
fiO
of Bost Of the ideas we hawser'' and (ii) refleotions growing
out of "the operation of our own mind within us, as it is
enployed about the ideas it has got.*^^ Knowledge, then, is
the result of an ezperienoe of the oonneotion of agreeaent
62
or disagreement between ideas. Thus, Looks oontinues, when
the reflect ire experienoe *is undoubtedly satisfied of the
63
agreement or disagreement of any ideas,* there is knowledge;
but when the refleotiwe experienoe presumes the oonneotion
"before it certainly appears, *^^ there is judgment.
Here, it is seen that the oharaoter of knowledge is twofold.
(i) On the one hand, knowledge is rewealed in perceptions oon-
taining an unoonditional certainty whioh ie intelleotually
risible; and (ii) on the other hand, judgment (not certain
knowledge) enooBpasses those peroeptions oontaining conditional
assurance, resulting from a presumption of probability on the
part of the intellect, fhat is inportant to notice here is,
that either directly or indirectly, all ideas hare their souroe
in sensation, i.e. all knowledge is directly or indirectly
deriwed from the senses, horeower, ideaa are, for the most
part, either refleotiwely deweloped (transformed sensations),
or, merely a concatenation of simple ideas, themselwes trans-
fig
formed sensations.”'’
(3) LMumiur. and tnowl.dg.—*Word8, in their prlnaty or iii-
edUt. aignifioation, stand for nothing but ideae iB. U&
( 10)
mlai 2L IMl MiJL ^7 xt aay b« said that words
have a double funotloni (1) •reoordlng of our own thoughte,«®8
and (li) “ooiMiunloattiig of our thoughte to others.* 8® i wtU
aentlon sore about the foraer In considering the third aepeot
of Looke*e philosophy. As to the latter, Looke aentlons the
• iaperfeotlons* and 'abuses* of language whloh Interfere
with the “ooiaaunloatlon of our Ideas to others.*®^ The test
for whether or not a language Is Infested with • laperfeotlons*
,
or whether It Is being ‘abused*, Is suggested where he sets
forth the ends of language; and again when he proposes a cri-
terion for establishing whether or not those ends are being
approxlaated *
Looke *s prograsuse seeks to establish three ends along
with their criteria. (1) The first end of language is that
of "Baking known one nan's thoughts or ideas to another." 8®
And, by noticing (a) "when aen hawe names In their mouths
without any determinate Ideas In their minds, whereof they
are the signs; or, (b) when they apply the commonly reoelwed
names of any language to Ideas, to which the common use of
that language does not apply them; or (o) when they apply
them very \msteadlly, making them stand, now for one, and by
and by for anothsr ldsa,*8^one may asosrtaln whether the end
Is being approximated. (11) The second end of language de-
olares that It convey "one aian's thoughts or Ideae. . . .with
B4
as muoh ease and quioknese as possible," which le determined
by seeing If (a) language Is rich enough to possess a signification
Ux)
for th&t partioular Idoa, or (b) man has yst Isarned ths
proper signlf loatlon for that partioular idea which doss exist
in ths language. And finally (iii)t Looks sent ions that end
oonosrnsd with ths assertion of truths about things; which is
dstsrainsd by looking at ths oonstitusnt ideas being signified
and properly securing their epistenologioal origin. In keeping
with those ends 9 and their oriteria, language is viewed as a
tool which is used by huaan beings to oonmunioate; and also
a tool whereby ideas are privately entertained, aanipulated,
and oatalogued*^^ In short, words are signs for ideas
Reality .*— Ideas which oan be either simple or complex,
are oatalogued in the mind of an individual by means of lan-
guage; and the original, blank piece of paper eventually is
filled with two kinds of things;”' (i) Mental propositions,
composed of ”a bare oonsideration of the ideas, as they are
68
in our minds, stripped of names,** and which are called 'truths
of thought'; and (ii), verbal propositions which are *mental
go
propositions as soon «s they are put into words , and which
are called 'truths of words'. Only the latter actually ap-
pear in discourse—following from the nature of discourse be-
ing either verbalised or written words, i.e. signs for ideas.
Looks goes on to say that propositions are a more or less
arbitrary putting-together of signs; and that the 'truths of
words' (actual propositions) are determined by whether or not
the. ideas those words signify stand in that same order, agree-
ing or disagreeing.^^
( 12 )
It •••» that th« ora* of tbl« poiltlon ratts in Looka*i
apgumant having to do with the linking of eiaple ideas to
reality. Briefly, I believe the argunent to prooeed in this
fashion. All simple ideas are viewed by the understanding
as immediate, distinct ideas •without taking notioe of the
71oauses that produce them.* However, an examination of these
oauees does draw the attention of Locke, and he notes that
the power * in a substance* which produces ideas is to be known
as a primary quality. Moreover, he distinguishes two kinds
of quality, (i) Primary qualities, e.g. solidity, extension,
motion or rest, number, and figure, all of which exist inde-
pendently of man's peroeiving them, produce ideas exactly
resembling those in the real substanoes. And (ii) secondary
qualities, e.g. cold, sweet, loud, blue, heavy, etc., which
(a) depend neoesearily on the primary qualities, but (b) have
a different ontological status, existing in the mind of the
72
peroeiver and not in the substanoes themselves. The real-
ity of simple ideas is the product of their provocation by
•those powers of things whioh produce them in our minds; that
73
being all that is requisite to make them real." In oonolu-
Sion, it seems that the strongest statement oonneoting simpls
74
ideas and substanoes, whioh •we are to know and distinguish,
•
is Looke*s remark to the effeot that: the reality of a simple
idea lies in its steady oorrespondenoe with the oonetitution
76
of tne 'real* thing from which it is derived*
In suimsary, then, 1 believe that the important points
( 13 )
to bo found in Looko, regard ins tbt relation of language to
reality, are six in nunber. (i) All knowledge is ultiaately
baaed upon tone form of ainple ideaa. (ii) Siaple ideaa are
produced in individuals primarily by tbe eensee, i.e. by ex-
perienoe. (iii) Simple ideaa are real, in that they are present
before the mind, but they do not exist in the subatanoes vhioh
produce them, (iv) Primary qualities are made obvious by the
ooourrenot of simple ideaa, i.e. the form of their presenta-
tion being an exact oopy of the real form in the eubstanoe.
(v) Sorda are signs for ideaa. (vi) Language, vocalised or
written, is an expression of an individual* a ideas.
(^) Hussell .»^It was the conviction of Bertrand Rueeell,
that Logic, which studies the laws of thought, was 'the eseenos
of philosophy*. In one of hia many books. Our Knowledge of
^^yternal reaarka that
the function of logic in philosophy. . .la all- important
....the true function of logic.... as applied to mat-
ters of experience. • .18 fuialytio rather than con-
struct ive. .. .while it liberates imagination as to
what tbe world myr refuses to legislate as
to what the world is.
I shall be oonoerned mainly with * matters of experience*;
spsolfloally in rsfersnos to what I believe Russell to have
arrived at in his epistemologioal analysis. To dsmonetrats
this outooAS, 1 shall treat three notions of Russellian phil-
oeophy: (1) knowledge of the external world; (2) senslbiUai
and (3) a logioally perfect language. The role of language
(U)
is inpxioit in the first two, and explicit in the last.
(1) ltoowl«ag> or Bxfrnal world
—
tIm *orld U known
ia two kinds of data—>hard and soft. Of the two, only *hard
data* are iaportant, for only they •reeiet the solwent influence
of oritioal reflection*, and preserve certainty, except for
incorrigible oases of * pathological* doubting. 78 Russell in-
dioates that there are two eorts of hard data. They are (i)
*the particular facts of sense, and (ii) the general truths
of logic. *79 Since *eeneatione are obviously the source of
our knowledge of the world, the particular facts of sense
mist be the basis of this knowledge. Therefore, as it seeas,
Russell grounds this knowledge in a *priaitive* acquaintance
with what is *ooapletely self-evident*, l.e. the iaaediate
facts of sense .81 He draws a distinction between knowledge
by aoquaintanoe and knowledge which is inferred, where knowl-
edge by aoquaintanoe is *essentially siapler than knowledge
of truths; and is logically independent of knowledge of truths,
directly
in faot, it is suoh that *we are^aware, without the interne-
diary of any process of inference. *83
How, Russell goes on to say that Inferred knowledge,
or knowledge by description, is actually the knowledge whereby
physical things are known; aoquaintanoe is with sense-data,
not with the physical object .8^ #*or example, a ‘table* is a
construction of a specific class of sense-data. Thus, that
"which makes up the appearance of my table are things with which
I have aoquaintanoe, things ismediately known to me just as
( 15 )
thty are.*®^ The distiaotlon ha la aaklng bare la tatwaan
that vlth whioh ona la directly aoquaiutad, a datiu, and that
vhioh ona Infara, tha olaaa of data; whioh ia tba aaeantial
diffaranoa aaparating hnowladga by acquaintance fron icnowladga
by daaoriptioD. Tha known * table* ia inferred from a oonatruct
of aanaa^data, baoauaa all that ona (actually) ia directly
acquainted with, are aingla, raw data. "The real table... ia
not iaaadlately known to ua at all, but Buot be an infaranoa
froa what ia iBBOdiately known, i.a. warioua ooourrancaa
of data.
Therefore, *My knowledge of tha table ia of tha kind
whioh wa ahall call 'knowledge by daaoription* . Tha 'table*
then, whioh auppoaedly axista in the real world independent
of it a being paroeiTad, ia oonoeaco. infarentially known
Thus, knowledge of the 'table* ia knowledge by deaoription,
where the 'table* ia deeoribed by aecma of phraaea of the
fora ”a ao-and>ao* (indefinite deaoriptiona) or *the ao-and-ao*
(definite deaoriptiona), and inferred to be the claaa of tboae
aense-data whioh ooour.®^
What Ruaaell tried to aoooBpliah here, X beliewe to
be the following. (1) He wanted to oonatruot phyaioal objeota,
and all thinga whioh are known, out of their appearanoea, i.e.
out of aenae-data.®® (li) Philoaophy had hiatorioally dictated
that an underlying aubstratun (an unknown *X*) supported the
attributes aotually peroeiTod as the phyaioal object;®Lad,
by aauis of th. ..MO-data, tb. 'table* Is described ( but
( 16 )
there is no poesibilitx of an aoquaintanoe with that under-
lying suhstratuB. “This *X* is an ontological surd, a oob-
ponent whioh not only eludes detection hut which is inoapable
QO
Of being described. This 'ontologioal surd* Russell dis-
penses with by inwoking the principle of OokhoB*s Rasor.^^
(iii) He then saye that
a * thing* will be defined as a certain series of
aspeots. • .whioh would ooBBonly be said to be of
the thing. To say that a certain aspect is an
aspeot ^ certain thing will aerely Bean that
it is one of those whioh, taken serially, are the
thing.®»
It is in this Banner that the 'table* is known by desoription
because s (a) It is inferred to exist in virtue of a oolleo-
tion of aspects, and (b) it is inferred to be desoribable
as the class of such aapmots.^^ *A11 our knowledge of the
table la really knowledge of truths » ; ”the word 'table* desig-
97
nating the oolleotion of aepeote **with which we are acquainted.*
The inference being Bade here is that the oolleotion of aspeots
I
'with whioh we are acquainted* constitutes what is known as
the real 'table*. *The actual thing whioh is the table is
not, striotly speaking, known to us at all.* *We know a
desoription* ^^of the thing, but not the thing itself. And
it is because a knowledge of the thing itself is inpossible
(logically), that the »X* of antiquity disappears, i.e. is
dispensed with.
(3) Hens ibilia *-*>Russell oontends that the fact that only
sense-data are inaed lately known,' is no reason to aBsune that
100
they are all that there is to be known. He elaborates on
( 17 )
thl* asBumptlon by deTtloplag tb« oono«pt of •onaibii^^ . (i)
Tho name labola thOBo'‘aotaphy«ioal‘^ object® whioh
are "the ultimate oonstltuent® of the phyeloal world. "lOl
(11) A one of the many eenftibilia. •become®
a sense-datum by entering Into the relation of acquaintance. 102
All senae-data, then, are aij^slolXla . Howewer,
It l8 a metaphyeloal question whether all eenelbllla
are sense-data, and an eplstomologloal question
whether there exist means of Inferring senelbllla
which are not data from those that are. . . .vihat {ne
mind adds to senglbllla. In faot. Is merely
awareness. 103
Therefore, a sense-datum I® a sensed senslblle .
8lnoe the world I® oonstltuted of senslbllla. the
possibility of their realization as sen&e-data the world.
This not to say that the totality of aenelbllla Is ever sensed,
a® there are an Infinite number of them. Accordingly, Russell
la able to eetabllsh the pereletenoe of physical objects be-
cause their existence Is not logically dependent on percep-
tion. In contrast, sense-data are logically dependent on
senslbllla. and In this way the TABLES hare been turned on
a olassloally, vexing problem. Moreover, In a most Intricate
arohlteoture, rather gothic In design, Including, among other
things, a six dimensional spaoe,!^^ Russell paves the way for
that hind of knowledge of the * table' which has the possibil-
ity of being the 'same* knowledge for two or more people.
Subtleties aside, Russell admits that his theory ' may be true'
and not that It Is ' certainly true', for he concludes that hie
theory Is 'avowedly hypothetical*.^^®
( 18 )
(3) Logio^ly &d«quat« ttattiMnt of
ftU80«ll*a Tlows on 'naMS*, *adj«otiT«s* , and 'relations*
would probably snoompass several volumes, including such things
as: the theory of proper names; the idea of univsrsals; the
theory of descriptions; the theory of logioal oonstruotiona
and many other notions. 1 shall touch on none of these in
this short rendering of the function of words in Fhiseellian,
epistesiologioal metaphysios*
Russell's analysis brought him to the oonolusion that
ordinary language, at least in the soienoes, should be replaced
by a logically perfect one. ^06 The logioal analysis which
eventuated in logioal atomism had but one task left after
positing the logically simple ftepsiblXi}E^ . That task wae to
link language to those metaphysical entities—the eensibilia.
Ordinary language did not seen to serve Russell's purpose,
as it "is imperfect because its words are often ambiguous and
more or less infeoted with vagueness • "106 Therefore,
The fundamental principle in the analysis of propo-
sitions oontainl^ desoriptions is this: Every
proposition which we oan understand must be com-
posed wholly of constituents with which we are
aoquainted . 109
Here, X understand Russell to moan that knowledge by descrip-
tion is logioally dependent on an aoquaintanoe with sense-data,
and that the olass of such sense-data is what the word, e.g.
'table', is generally recognised to designate.
HO If this
interpretation is correct, then the heart of this position
seems to reside in that relation which sense-data bear to the
'External World'. Henoe, Russell holds that
In a logically perfeot language the words in a prop-
osition would correspond one by one with the ooapo->
nents of the corresponding faot, with the exception
of suoh words as 'or,' 'not,' 'if,' 'then,' which
hawe a different function. In a logically perfeot
languaige, there will be one word and no wore for
every simple object, and everything that is not
simple will be expressed by a oombination of words,
by a oombination derived, of oourse, from the words
for the simple things that enter in, one word for
eaoh simple component • 111
That is, the words which are not fxirther definable, *the
indefinable terms of language, would correspond one*ta-one
with the logical simples. These undefinable terms, Russell
says, "would represent symbolically what I mean by 'the ulti-
mate furniture of the world*.
However, as noted earlier, knowledge by acquaintance
is oonfined to one's own sense«»data, and not to those of others.
What is logically simplest, in so far as it is known by ac-
quaintance, is privately known. Russell acknowledges this
point with respeot to a logically perfeot language when he says
its vocabulary, would be very largely private to one
speaker. That is to say all the names that it would
use would be private to that speaker and oould not
enter into the language of another speaker.Hd
And even though the one-to-one correspondence (undefined term
to logioal simple term) is a matter of form where the "complexity
of the symbol oorresponds very closely with the oomplexity
of the faot symbolised by it,"^^^ Russell's logically perfeot
language remains a private affair. This epistemological re-
duotioniem which ends in knowledge by acquaintance, yields a
unique oonneotion to reality, but at the same time, one which
( 20 )
Ifi aTowedly both hypothetloaX and prlTata.^^^
In suwBaryi I ballaTa tha iaportant points ooTsrsd in
Ruasall to be flTo. (1) The world is a logical oonstruot of
seneibilia. (ii) A eensibUe with whioh one is acquainted is
a eense-datun; and a ooaplez (infinite) of senaibilla. or*
ganited in aooordanoe with certain lawe» ie a phyeioal object,
(iii) A physical object ie regarded as a olaes of eenee*data—
as a logical construct, (iw) Undefined words eyabolioally
represent and are in a one-to-one foraal oorrespondenoe with
the logically irreduoiblea, whioh are known by acquaintance*
(v) As all knowledge rewolwee on an acquaintanoe with the
* logical eiaple*, and since such acquaintance is a priwate
affair, knowledge of the world can only be ezpreeeed in state-
ments such as * this ie my world* or * this is red* whioh are,
in reality, meaningless to others as the referent ( this) can
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I b«Ii«Te that both th« Idtaliat and the eaplrioiet
entertain and ultimately reckon with a particular kind of
putatlwe entity that le of primary Importanoe In their ap-
proach to the problematic relation of language to reality.
its related
Thle putatlwe entity and^HB notions eiiMi Bmt mm l ehall
designate the oonoept of an Image. Suoh a concept, X feel,
le common to both the Idealist and the empiricist as they
Inewltably posit this entity In the mind; the location of whloh
lies between language and reality. To point out the warloue
roles of this entity, X undertake a threefold task In this
chapter. (A) I shall display and briefly explain schemat-
ically the functions of this Interrenlent entity as It arises
In the programme of eaoh philosopher; then (B) In exposition,
X compare the uses of this putatlwe entity ae Illustrated In
the two approaches. (C) Finally, X shall Indicate how Idealist
and emplrlolst alike are beset by a oommon problem when they
try to explain the nature of the relation between (1) the
entity and reality on the one hand, and (11) the entity and
language on the other hand.
(1 ) aoh..atlo funotlon of •nXitf—A .oh.wtlo r.pr.s.nUtlon
of the interwenlent entity eerres two purposes. First, it
facilitates an understanding of the entity's function. Thus,
Its function In eaoh philosopher's dootrlnes can be seen
( 36 )
quiokly, dlveettd of •ztenaivo •zposltlon. dooondly, th«
sohoma reduoas the ohanoe of any later oonfuslon whioh sight
arise when I refer to the putative entity employed by eaoh
philoaopher ae an *iaage*. That is to aay, the word image

























BtlTf gQh«M—At a Tula it la trua that
on the view of eaoh philosopher reality (column three, 03}
tends to be explained metapWa^oally;^ the image (03) funotlona
as an intermediary abridgement, from language to reality;^ and
language (01), a similar factor for eaoh philosopher, draws
its model from natural disoourse.^ Language, irrespeotive of
the philosopher, is regarded ae the expression of thought con-
tent a The words 'validated by' are aotually the subject of
the third section of this chapter# 1 shall only mention here
that they imply that some kind of correspondence subsists be-
tween the putative entity (03) and reality (03)# The character
of this correspondence dictates the degree to whioh a specified




(B) An thf two aangcaoh»«
—
This •otion d«al8 with oowpar Isons ot ths funotlon of tbs
inags (C2) in ths Idsnllst and snplriolst approaohss. Eaoh
phllosophsr shall hs sunsarily trsatsd and ooaparsd; thsn ths
two approaohss shall bs oonparsd with ons anothsr*
Initially, all thought oontsnt, on ths Tisw of Plato
and Lsibnis, is inspiritsd in ths Bind bsoauss of ths indi-
idual*s sapirioal orisntation* auoh an iapurs, sapirioal
boginning of thought does not OBbarrass either philosopher
for two reasons, (i) Aooording to ths Platonio thsory, ths
essenoes which are known aftsr birth, are saplrioally stiwu-
lated iaages* However, by definition, the eseenoee have an
eternal nature, prsosding any partioular psroection and, as
it were, aankind in general. Both the oonoept of essences,
and ths Leibnisian theory of aonade, explioitly stats that
*sssenos* and *Bonad* are of an sternal nature, (ii) The
a-teaporality of eessnoes and aonade proTidss a asans whereby
these two philosophers haws an * absolute ' standard with which
to Batch the individual's relatively pure iaages. Talidatlon
of iaages, for either thinker, is dsterainsd by the degree
and kind of oorrespondenoe obtaining between the iaage (03)
«Lnd reality (03). Kxperienoe is used only as the teaporally-
priaitive provooation of mental isuigee.
The eapirioiste are somewhat different. The Lookean
'siaple idea' and the Ruseelllan » sense-datua' are both stimu-
lated by, and derive their validation from, some kind of
( 30 )
enter
emplrloal orUntation. Simple Ideae^i aa iadw
vldual through the eensee^ on the foroe of primary qualitiee*
Senae-data discharge themaelTea upon aa Individual aa he la
Immediately acquainted with things. It la an empirical orienta-
tion of this type that causes the emplrlolat to postulate, or
aeeume, some sort of oontlnual reality, from which springs
the flux of experience.
To ooBipare these two approaches, 1 shall ask, and try
to answer the following question} How do tbs idealist and the
emplrlolst account for the Identity of Images from person to
person, in order to aohiewe some certainty of there being a
similarity of icnowledge from person to person? The answer to
this question leads to further, and irritating questions In
both camps. The Idealist seems to be In less difficulty beoause
he claims an absolute standard with which all his Images can
be tested $ and, as a result of the strength of each * matching*,
he Is assured of eome elmllarlty In the thought content (C2)
from person to person. However, the method of matching (for
Plato * participation* and for Lelbnla clearness and dlstlnot-
nees), remains a most obsoure and ambiguous part of their
philosophies, nevertheless, It Is only in aooordanoe with
soiwe kind of matoblng—and this is oharaoterlstioally only a
matter of degree in each of the Idealists being considered—
that surety oan be reached, l.e. that there can be a measure




Tht •nplrioist ! in no bettor posseetion of iin ade-
quate answer to this question. Indeed, it eeewi that Looks
Merely aseuMs the continuity of an underlyin« substanoe; then
tries to oonneot it with thought wia the oonoept of 'prinary
qualities* whioh, he skaintains, are inherent in the abiding
substanoe* Russell's answer is grounded in a "strong hypo-
thesis," backed by the oonteaporary Laws of Physios*^ Howewer,
the oonsequenoes of Russell's position result in a theory of
knowledge whioh is alaoet oompletely subjeotiwe, in a Berkeylian
sense The best job that either of these eapirloist^oan do,
by way of assuring the walidity of an inage, is to oollate the
non-serial ooourrenoe of apparently ciailar iaages, and to
assuae that that siailarity ^ reality. The ooourrenoe of a
criterion of siailarity, exterior to the images, presents a
Bultitude of oonfusion for the eapirloist*
In suamary then, there are two points. (1) Neither the
idealist nor the empirioist oan give an adequate account of how
the image of one person ooinoides with that of anothsr person,
(ii) They share a oommon problem in this respeot. It is that
of aatohing the image with reality*
( 0) A orobKa co—on to both tlw tdfAXUt »nd erotrloUt—
The heart of the question regarding the similarity of images,
lies in the kind of matohing whioh validates the image. This
eeotion plans to inquire about what this relation could be,
between (i) the image and reality, and (11) the image and
( 32 )
language. Generally speaking the relation Is one of struc-
ture. That Is, both Idealist and eaplrlolst lean toward a
relational oorreepondenoe of structure. This does not discount
the fact that the correspondence might be that of the picture
to the pictured. At the present time, and following from the
schematic representation, the most essential relation to estab-
lish is that between thought and reality, for it is in the
establishment of this relation that it is possible to under-
stand ^gw thought is ‘hooked up‘ with reality; which is to say:
in virtue of determining this relation, thought is given ooi>-
tent. Then, and only then, does language have anything to
express. This shall become clearer in the following preeen-
tat ion.
(1) Ttw .ntltT (03) Mid r.allty (08)— .opro.mh Mmt.tii.
some sort of formal relation whioh, it is presumed, validates
the image, and at the same time oonneots thought to reality.
X think this point is significant. Plato speaks of a ‘formal*
relation in opposition to an empirical relation because of its
permanenoe, in oontrast to that of the ever-changing, empirical
images.^ Leibnis adopts the principle of formal relations
(i.e. the pre-established harmony of the monads) suggested in
the earlier Plato. Thus, the Leibnisian ‘concept* is formally
related to its oorresponding monads; and the 'concept* gains
its validity when the patterned arrangement of its constituents
correspond to the fundamental pattern of the irreducible monads.
When suoh a oorreepondenoe ooours, Leibnie eaye there is a true,
( 33 )
oltar, and diatlnot Idaai !••• an iaaga.
Looke also alludes to a foraal relationship between
what he has called the *slnple ideas* and reality. 1 want
to dSBonstrate oarefully wherein I feel this fonsnl relation-
ship liea» because I do not beliewe it is always obrious. To
begin with, Looke distinguishes primary and seoondary quail*
ties* The former are independent of peroeption, but are also,
upon perception, exact * resemblance s* of what is in reality.
What is of interest here is just what constitutes a perception
of primary qualities* Looke holds that primary qualities are
known only through the seoondary qualities, i.e. through simple
ideas. Mow the question is how are they known through the
simple ideas, which are themselres subjectiwe and not a re-
liable picture of reality* I beliewe it is in the form of the
manifest simple ideas that primary qualities are known. Looke
holds that the seoondajry qualities are dependent upon the
idea of
primary qualities, and that the^known primary qualities are
exact resemblanoes of what is in reality. X conclude that if
the secondary qualities are neoessarily dependent upon the
primary qualities, and if the primary qualities are known
through the form of the manifest simple ideas, and If the
primary qualities produce ideas exactly resembling those in
reality**then there is a formal relation between the simple
ideas and reality. In so far as ihissell is concerned, I shall
only mention that almost all the relations he is oonoemed
with, are formal relations, and that they issue from one's
( 34 )
&oquaint&no« with tblnge. Thato foraaX ralations ware pre*
character
Tloualy found to be enplrioal in and eubjeotiwe
in oharaoter.^
The difference in the idealist and eapirioiet poeition,
aside from the faot that they both advocate some kind of formal
relation between the inage {02) and reality (03), oan be seen
in the Banner they use to depict this relation. In the oase
of the idealist the foraal relation io rationally entertained
without empirical considerations (aside from provocation);
whereas in the case of the empiricist » the formal relation ie
grounded in a non*serial» suppocedly similar experience of
simple ideas or sense«>data. The continual approximation of
suoh repetitious images leads the empiricist to believe that
these similar forms are the forms of reality. However, it is
nothing other than the empirioaX faot of an assumed constant
conjunction of images that Isads the empiricist to believe that
this fora and ^hat
.
form, are faithful editions of reality.
I regard the oorrespondenoe between image and reality
o
to be of three poesibXe types. To guarantee the validity of
the image, it must be (a) »n exact copy of the corresponding
reality, such as might be exemplified by a mirror image j or
(b) in one-to-one correspondence with those elements of reality
of which it is a picture; or (o) identical in structure with
the reality of whioh it is a picture. I ehall examine these
various oharaotsrl sations nsoessarily implied by this inter-
curring entity, touching briefly on some of the difficulties
particular to each.
( 36 )
oopy theory intends to rodvioo the
Image to what ie oonparable to a mirrored refleotlon of real-
ity, which ie the tame as to eay that thought content ie a
mental reflection of reality.® There appear to be two general
oritioiene of thie vietf. Firet^ the nature of the image ie
Intrineioally different from that of which it ie a reflection.^®
Certainly the copy in the mirror looke like that of which it
ie a copy, but it only * looks* that way and does not feel,
smell, taste, or sound that way.^^ The copyist, then, must
oope with the formidable problem of stating an account which
describee exactly how this copy a copy. This is not in
the least accomplished by merely asserting that the image is
a mirrored image of reality.^^
Beoondly, when the image ie a true image, i.e. one
which matches reality, the oopyist must explain the need for
the preaenoe of both the image and that whioh the image came
from. Thera would then be two, qualitatiwely identioal, things:
the image and the imaged* If they are qualitatiwely identioal,
and only quant itat iwely differentiated, then it seems unneo*
esaary to multiply entities, and to Ineiet on the exietenoe
of both the image and the imaged. Moreover, the qualitative
identity (if oarried to the extreme) would require that the
oopy-»image of an elephant seen at the oirous be, in mind, an-
other elephant. This, to use Bussell* e phrase, is "medioally
impossible*. The oopy theory then suffers on two counts. First,
the image, on principle, is different in nature from that
whioh it images. And secondly, if the image is not different
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in natura fro« the laaged, than an unnaoaaaary Bultlpliolty
of Idantloal antltlaa reauXta, In addition to tha qualltatlTa
lapoBslbiiity of oonooption*^^
<b) Oorra. ‘11(1# B -—Tha seoond oharaotarlsatlon
ttttlntalne that there la a one-to-one oorrelation between tha
aleoants of tha Inage^^ (02) and those of reality (03). Again,
there eesn to be two general orltlolena of the position. First,
take the case in which *A* and art eleuentB in the iaage,
and »a* and are the corresponding elenents in reality a ^6
If *A* bore a certain relation to *B% tege *A* was more eo-
and-eo than then 'a* would have to be more so-and-so than
*b* in reality* These aeyunetrloal relatione are the very
type of relation that renderc this view so irritating. For
it follows that if just the eleuente have to oorreepond, and
not their arrangenent too, then the image oould correspond
to either reality *a£b' or *b£a* and be regarded ae a true
picture in both instanoes.^^ duoh a pioture would not be very
informative.^^ The only thing that oan be said in this context,
is that a oae*to-one oorrelation of elsmsnts may function as
a nsosesary reason for the validation of the image, but not
as a sufficient reason.
A ssoond, and further difficulty, arises when the cor*
related elements are oonoeived to be qualitatively identical."
Even if they just correspond *ln some respect', the two orlti-
oiems in (a) are applloable.20 Moreover, if It were granted
that the elements oould be related »ln «oa» reopeot' and that
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this r«sp«ot was not one of copying^ then there would hawe
to be a or iterIon upon whioh the reepeot oould be eetabllehed.
If auoh a oriter ion were adopted, it oould neither be a part
of the eleaente of the iiia^e, nor of the eleaents of reality,
and at the caae tine renain a part of either approaoh. That
ifi to say, neither an eztra-aeneory, nor a trancoendentaX ori-
terion would be acceptable to the eapirioist, and the idealiet
would be hard pressed to account for the public use of suoh
a crlterion.^^ the eeooxid oharaoterisatlon then hao two wain
defects. First, it cannot explain asyuu&etrical relations;
and second, it cannot explain the type of correlation coupling
the eleaents of the inage to those of reality.
(o) Identical atructure .<.*«.Yhe laat charaotorisation holds
that an identity of Mil the structure of the image and that
of reality validates the image in virtue of ite precenoe. The
struoturs of the image eleaents oorresponds to the structure
of the real elements. Some of the previous criticisms are
applicable here. However, in addition to them, structural
oorrsapondenoe seems inadequate for the following reasons.
Since the validity of an image depends solely on its oorrs-
soondenoe to that identical structure in reality, the imago
eonaisting of elements would be validated by any real
struciture » blanks reveals how they oould
be filled in by any elements in reality, euoh as ‘b^e* or
»aro* or »l^t* etc., and thus validate the image UjB*, as
long as the structures remained identical. Oertainly these
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Indiaorlislnato *f lliinsa-ln* would not do; atruotural Idantity,
then, seems like an untenable position to support as an aooount
for the Yalidity of the isi&ge. In conclusion I think that
the oharaotorisation by struoture (c) and by one>to*one cor-
relation (b) severally, or in combination, faih to give a
sound explimation of the type of oorrespondenoe which would
endow the image with validity*
(U) Ib*. gntttr (oa) and laaguatw oan non any, aftar
an historical exposition (Cb. I) and a critical evaluation
(Oh. XX, Sec a A, B and 0, 1.) that the general oonoem of this
paper le avowedly that of the intervenient image, in so far
as it seems to draw a curtain, separating language from reality.
The means of validating this interjacent image appaurently de*
termines the function of Ite attendant language; whether the
image is construed as a picture picturing the struotural onil-
tiplloity of reality, or as a copy copying each qualitative
detail in reality: language must somehow follow suit. I
therefore want to examine the relation of language to Image,
and see how language follows suit.
tTevlously X have oonoentrated on the imege-real ity
relation, but with a full appreciation of the fact that the
Idealist as well as the empiricist, indeed, each representative
philosopher, treaV^language as a system of signs which serve
as agents for expressing the objects of thought, i.e. images.
Language functions In each view as a system of signs which
are expressions for a complex of images; and only, quite
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indlreotly, dote language funotlon ae a syetoa of eigne for
the objeote of reality. For each pbiloeopher the it
in eone kind of foraal oorreepondenoe with reality
{ and aleo
there ie the general tendency to hold that the ie^ge ie ew-
pirioally initiated. However, X readily admit that it eeeafl
that the eign (Cl) ie in eoae way fornally related to an
adjacent reality, but thie ie true only by indirection. In
eakOh of the aforementioned theoriee, language ie a eyetem of
eigne acting ae expreeeione for the images, i.e. for the thought
content. The images are in some kind of oorreepondenoe with
reality. It ie only in an indirect, and rather eeoondary
aanner^^ that language is in some sort of oorreepondenoe with
reality, aooording to the views of the four philoeophere.^^
It makes no differenoe on this view, if the interpreta-
tion of the eeoondary role of language ia oorreot, whether or
not words, i.e. eigne, signify the *forn* of the image which
somehow oorreeponds to the real objects, or signify the image
in its qualitative oorreepondenoe to the real objeotei^B words
are merely the signs for the images vords need not be copies,
nor pictures. And though each philosopher provisionally equates
language and thought, interpreting language as a system of
signs^^ vhioh, in some manner, are copies of * objects* in
reality, each philosopher also alludes to * objects* of thought.
These objects, intsrvening between language and reality, I
have designated by the oonoept of the image. On the view of
each representative philosopher the image t (a) seeias to have
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a piotur«~lik« reality; 0>) has either a foraal or a qualita-
tlTe reoenhlanoe to reality; and (o), ia that whioh language
aignifiee,^^ Saoh aporoaoh ia then beaet by the problem of
accounting for the priTateneae of aubjeotiToly oriented imageai
to whioh» auppoaedly, people* a worda refer30..for their meaning.
The idealist approaoh auffera from the faot that, by definition
of *eaaenoe* or *monad*, hia image oannot approximate
either eaaenoe or monad without becoming the raapeotire *eaaenoe*
or * monad*; and the relatiwe oharaoter of a mere approximation
does not allow him to know whether othera hawe ao true an image
as he haa. The empiricist aaaumes a aubstantial continuum,
but hia assumption ia only bom out by what amounta to nothing
more than hia own, priwate peroeption of a non-aerial collation
of past inatanoea he uses to make a further, and ewen bolder
assumption, namely that hia image ia both identioal with reality,
and with that of others. This might well be the oase. But,
hia own collection of inatanoea oould, oonoeiTably, not resem-
ble, indeed, be identioal to, any one else*s.
In oonolusion then X find that both approaches make two
things quite clear. First of all, that the meaning of a word
(i.e. its referent iisage) is bounded on all sides by that pub-
lioally inmioes sable and ewen unapproachable medium: the phil-
osopher* a own mind, knd secondly, that neither the ontological
‘reality*, nor ite structure, can be established by
an examination of language. This is especially true
in the
light of the apparently solipaistio position each
philosopher
ultimately seems to arrive at.
( 41 )
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chapter
In thle^pMi I shall try to present a relatlyely short
exposition of Wittgenstein’s views with respect to private
Chapter
language. £ooor<iing to the text of^Mii I, it appears evident
that language funotions, in both the idealist and eapirioist
approach, ae some sort of bridge whioh extends from the image,
or personal thought content, to the real world. Moreover, and
most oonoisely, at this point in our survey, it seems that a
solipeistio position is the result of each philosopher's pro-
gramme. This happens as a oonsequenoe of being led by that
recurrent tendency in the history of western philosophy to
postulate a copy of reality, whioh is then posited the mind ,
and in connection with whioh words are supposed to obtain their
meaning. If the preceding exposition of these various postu-
lations has been correct, then each philosophic doctrine
embraces the trappings of what Wittgenstein calls private lan-
guage. Terminologioally, though, he usually speaks of 'sen-
sations' or 'feelings', rather than of images or putative
entities. However, I think it is possible to substitue for
'image' what Wittgenstein terms 'sensation'; and assuming this
identity, I proceed to use the term 'sensation' instead of
either 'image' or 'entity'.
At the outset of this chapter I should stress that
any reading of Wittgenstein's views is generally confronted
with a number of problems. I shall mention four partioularly
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pertinent onei« flret, it Is noted that Wittgenstein* s apho-
rlstlo style does not always lend Itself to paraphrasing,
aalnly because his Ideas, when Initially encountered, seen
stark, without point, and thus often require a oontaitxial set«
ting not yet oonmon to normal philosophic discourse, seoond,
there are a great number of phllosophlo probleas that gain
the attention of this aphorlstlo style. Among them are 'naming*,
*prlwate sensations*, 'Infinity*, 'language*, 'loglo*, *mathe-
matlos*, as well as a host of others. At many points In Witt-
genstein's writing. It Is not evident just whloh (problem)
Is being developed, or, as he would say, whloh problem Is
being dissolved.^ It Is, therefore, aotually a matter of
personal choice, that one problem rather than another should
be singled out of his text as being espeolally relevant. Thus,
any separation, l«e. abstraction from context, rune the danger
of misinterpreting Wittgenstein's views* I do, however, hope
that I have done a measure of justice to his position. Third,
It Is necessary to mention that, at times, X shall have to
attribute Ideas to Wittgenstein, the justification of whloh
oan only be realized through Interpretation; and that no In^
terpretatlon oarrles preoedenoe over the original work Itself.
And fourth, there are several oonoepts whloh I have found It
neoesaary to mention, but whloh oannot be completely developed
In this survey. However, they might be touched upon, to the
extent that their general tone and function becomes obvious.
Wittgenstein says that a private language Is one whloh
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only the spoakor understands.^ The natural question to ask
then is *lhat would euoh a language be likeT*; or aaybe (that
would the words of a private language aeanT*; or perhaps
i«There would the words go for their aeaningt* Generally speak-
ing, these questions oall attention to the function of language,
and in particular to the possibility of there being suoh a
thing as a private language. What then would a private lan-
guage be like? It would probably be a language in which
Z sinply associate names with sensations and use
these names in desoriptions.3
These names, assooiated with a partioular individual's sen-
sations, would be employed in oonversat ions as surrogates for
the appropriate sensations. Two problems attend this position.
The first one (A) is idiether or not those hearing a oertain
nsjae have the same assoolative sensation as the speaker. The
second problem (B) faces the question of whether the speaker
himself aoourately associates a given name with the same sen-
sation eaoh time he uses that name. The former 1 treat under
the heading 'external feasibility* beoauae it has to do with
the speaker's words being understood by others. The latter
1 treat under the heading 'internal feasibility' because It
has to do with the speaker understanding his own words.
(A) External feaeibility.^lt is genuinely difficult to see
how others oould understand the names in a private language.^
For, Wittgenstein remarks that the speaker, presumably, asso-
ciates a sign “J** with a specif io sensation which he has. He
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as8\uie0 that by oonoentrat Ing hla attention on that aeneation
the aeaoolatlTe algn *J* reoelvea its aeanlng.^ On this Tiew,
the oonoept of meaning la oonetrued ae a prooeee in vhloh the
spoken or written occurs In oonjunotlon with a kind of
Inner pointing at a sensation, l.e. a brand of *prirate oaten-
alve definition*.® To repeat! the meaning of "J* aeons to be
eatabXlahed by oonoentrating the attention on a aenaation, and
this impreasee on the mind of the speaker a oonneotion between
the sign »J*» and a j*senaation$ and in this manner *»J» beoonea
meaningful.
If the meaning of dependa on the kind of oonour-
renoe desoribed abore, ffittgenatein finds it logical to aasume
that no one but the speaker knows what "J* means.^ Certainly
the speaker's audience does not have aooesa to his j-aensation,
and short of having the same oonjunotive sensation,® *J* could
mean (refer to) anything they wished it to mean, i.e. they
might all assooiate it with different sensations* In oonolu-
Sion, then, it appeare that a private language oannot be pub-
lioly understood beoauset ( 1 ) the meaning of a sign **J* depends
on an akssooiative J^sensation, and this is privately deter-
mined; therefore (ii), the public (a) would not know to what
sensation the speaker's sign is conjoined, or, even if it were
somehow possible for them to secure such knowledge, (b) they
oould not have the same eoneation.
(B) Internal feasibility .*-*InitialIy. it would aeem that at
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least the speaker hlasslT knove what his words Man. After all,
he deteraines what signs to associate with his nanifold sensa*
tione. If nothing else, he is wont to proolaia, •! know... only
froa my own oase.”^® Howewer, upon close exaaination he finds
seweral annoying qusMtions which he Is hard pressed to answer.
The first thing the speaker asks hiasslf is •Does the
aa«e sensation appear in oonjunction with those warious written
or vooal ooourrenoes of the sign *J«7* Indeed, the possibility
that a different sensation oould appear, and therefore, that
any sensation oould be used as the referent sensation for *J*,
would prowe ruinous to hie theory of aeaning. This had to
be the oase beoauae suoh a diwersity of sensations would inply
that there was no continuity to the aeaning of ”J*, e.g. it
oould be associated with this sensation at one tiasi and with
that one at another tiae* It is from just this type of ques-
tion that the speaker realises he had aerely been assuning,
on prewious occasions | that the sane sensation appeared with
the various written or vooal ooourrenoes of *J*. How, however,
he is forced to search for some test with which to judge
whether or not the sane j«»sensation does, in fact, return each
tine is written or spoken* In other words, he is forced
to question the very assunption upon which he had been acting
without hesitation whatsoever.
In developing a test to oheok the sane sensation, the
speaker has to oonfront further difficulties. For, if a sex>-
sation is oonoeived to be like a miniature model (like a model
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of a *squaro to tho roal squaro rlgg«r riding tho
wavot), sitting on a shslf in the mind, hs U lod to bslisrs
that in ordsr to ass if ssnsation is the sans as that
sensation, the speaker would only need to look at then, and
oonparo* The speaker oonfesses, howswer, that in the past he
had not done this sort of thing, that he had not oheoked his
referent sensations in any way at all. What ^ regarded as
a j-sensation, was a j*sensation, i.e. the oriterion for his
oorreot use of *J* was what be said it was. And, as Wittgen-
stein points out, in suoh oases
wbatewer is going to seen right to ae is right. And
that only neans that here we oan*t talk about 'right*.
The speaker now realises, sinoe he had only assuned the saae
sensation to appear with each ooourrenoe of *J*, that he ae*
tually had no oriterion for judging whether or not the sane,
or a different sensation appeared Beoause of an awareness
of this state of affairs, (a) that a different sensation oouLd
appear, and (b) that if it did his oeaning for *J* would neo-
essarily be oonpletely unetable»«the speaker quiokly tries to
fornulate a neans of assuring the continuity of his j^sensation.
Again, if sensations are little models in the mind,
there would be no trouble in renenbering froa time to tine if
one model looked like another.^) But sensations are not models,
they are sensations. Assuredly, if two models o<»pared wers
like two sensations oompared ewerything would be fine for the
speaker. Yet note what happens if this imagery, i.e. that of
models, takes over in a description of sensations. It SLS&
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said that *thle nodal looks like that one*; howeveri it pan*
not be eald that *this sensation looks like that one*, beoauot
the latter, on the epeaker's approach, reduces to » this sensa-
tion X is the sane as that one T, because of a third sensaticn
X'* The significance of this sudden propagation of additional
sensations is that the speaker could not coapare X to T short
of inroking another sensation Z, itself open to further veri-
fication via an illinitable array of linking sensations, what
Wittgenstein wishes to indicate here is that any appeal to a
criterion for Judging the identity of X and T saist, on the
speaker's view, be another sensation. He is left in a quan-
dary, wondering if his sensation Z (that X ^ identical to T
at t' )» is the same as his sensation A (that X Jjs. identical
» to T at t » •) I ai inf initua *
finally» the speaker asks hiaself *What does sane mean?*
For, if 'saae* is a oousonly used word, i.e. a word in ordinary
language, and the speaker is not certain of anything which is
public (because he only has his own sensations upon which he
can rely), then ’ease* oust have an assooiative sensation-
like all other worde^-in order to invest it with neaning.^^
On the one hand, an appeal to an outside criterion for con-
firming the aimilarity of sensations is ruled out on his view,
and on the other hand, an appeal to his own sensations even-
tuates in an infinite regress. The crucial point to be brought
out here is that the formulation of a criterion neoesaarily
’‘consists in appealing to something independent,** which the
( 51 )
sp«a)c«r la Mthodologlo&lly inoapabla of roaliilng, and mainly
booauso that would moan appoalin^ to aomothing othor than hla
now tanuoualy raourrant aanaationa. Howawer, it ia olaarly
aridant to him that hia aanaationa may ba diffarant upon thair
oTory praaantation. Hawarthalaaa, hia poaition logically ra-
fuaaa him tha right to patition an outaida aouroa, and X hardly
baliawa it ia aenaibla to oonaidar that ba would patition him-
aalf«^7 Thu8» tha apaahar ia atrandad in tha wildarnaaa of
hia priTata aanaationa* It ia, then, without aeaning for him
to apeak
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anyone about thia aenaation being different froa
that one, or of their being the aaBO—unleaa 'difference* or
'aajaeneaB* are public toraa, which, on hia grounds, ia inoon-
oeivable. The apeaker ia apparently situated in that poaition
I would like to oharaotarise by paraphyasing Oertrude Stein:
a aenaation ia a aenaation ia a aenaation.
X oonoluda that thia picture of a private language leada
nowhere, even though it oonatitutee what ia ordinarily under-
atood as a private language, if not aa language In general*
Clearly, it can be seen, to uea Wittgenetein*a expression,
if aa a natter of logic you axolude other people's
having eonething, it loses its senaa to say that
you have it.lw
for what would ba tha object of talking to a group of people
about if it were inpoaaible for them to gain acoaea to
tha j«*senaation of the apeaker, which, on hia view, would ba
the only sufficient condition he would accept aa their under*
standing what was neant by They would obviously have no
(M)
idta wbat •J* Th*y would hawo no way of difforontlat-
ing froK or *0* oto«; and in inatanooa of thia kind,
would Man to than, and, in faot, to tha apaakar alao,
awarything and nothlng.^^ Tbarafora, tha oonoapt of Maning
in a prlwata languaga adnita to no awldanoa of oritaria, aithar
axtamal or intamal, wharaby aithar tha publlo or tha apaakar,
raapaotiwaly, could aaoartaln tha oontinuoua uaa of a oartain
aign; i.a. whathar or not tha aama aanaation waa balng anployad
for tha warloua wrlttan or wooal ooourranoaa of a apaoifio aign.
horaowar, Wittganataln, who waa alwaya awara of thoaa
who oontinua to hawa doubta about a prlwata languaga, raoog-
niaaa tha baaio nature of tha problan of noaning whan ha aug-
gasta that
Thara ia a taaptation for m to aay that only wy
own azparianoa la raal: *X know that 2. ***» haar,
feal pains, ato., but not that anyona alaa doaa.
1 can't know this, baoausa X an I and they are they.*
On tha othar hand X faal ashaMd to say to anyona that
my azparianoa Is tha only raal one; and X know that
he will reply that ha oould say exactly tha saM
thing about his azparlanoa.23
And going on, ha adda, how oould X mention anything about the
possibility of another person's exparianoa unless there was
some awldanoa for there being such?
After all, one oan only say aOMthing If one has
learned to talk* 33
This seaming truism, this apparent platitude, has tha greatest
slgnlfloanoa whan It Is thoroughly scrutinised.
(B3)
footnot«B—>chapt«r III
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On« war of dOBonatratlcg horn incoaprehenalblt *BManlngti
ar« in a prlvata language le to ask *Hov would I teaoh the
waning of a wordT* ^ Queatione of thie order are eepeoially
qualified to dieoloee how referent aeneatione in private lai^
guage elude an/ publio detention. And if the referent aenea-
tiona oannot be detected, then it ia neoeaaary to oonoiude
that on auoh a view *neaninga* of worda have no inter<-aubjeotive
aignif ioanoe. Moreover, by parity of reaaoning, Z an aaaured
there nuat be another oonoept of *neaning* whioh doea not a»-
aooiate aeaning with an *oooult prooeee*. Juat what thia
other oonoept of meaning aight look like ia the broader oon-
oem of thia chapter.
I believe that by careful exaaination of diveraely
oompoaed oaaea in whioh worda are learned, or (and what ia
even more telling) one in whioh a word ia being taught,^ it
ia poaaible to arrive at a potentially clearer oonoept of
'meaning* than haa hitherto been encountered. Oenerally, when
aetting out to teaoh a word, one deaoribea those actual aitua-
tiona that oiroumaoribe the word's usage. ^ from the ensuing
descript ions of these aituatione the meaning of the word will
emerge. Therefore, I shall propose that the prime emphaaia
in investigating the 'meanings' of words in a language, should
be that of describing the oolleotivc ooourrenoes of those
words.
Saoh word's meaning, it ia olaimed, evolves from these deaoriptions.
( 56 )
With this Idta as a aotlvating foros, I shall try to aoooa-
pllsh four things in this chapter i (a) to explain a preralent
fallaoy pertaining to the possihiXity of suhetantiyes being
supported by oo-existing substances; (B) to shov how a word
does not obtain its neaning; then (0), to allude to what is
inyolTsd in learning a word; and finally (D), to suggest how
it might be establiehed that a word has been learned.
(A) Tt>« >ut»tiLnUT. ftllMy.—OrdlniUT dLoour.., in whlob
I include the polenios of Philosophy^ contains a strong tend-
ency to thinks and often quite deeply to feel, that ewery sub*
stantiwe is sosehow oonneoted with a substanoe.^ A paradign
for this would be the substantive **dog*^whioh supposedly refers
to the *soaatoio* dog. Buoh a tangible exaaple need not in-
spire any quibbling, but it usually does when the logic of Its
spatial-tenporal character is iapoeed upon, and takes over in
the descriptions of *aeaning* for what are regarded as 'abstract*
terns like "bright*,® "thought",^ "knowledge**,^ and a host of
others. What happens in suoh oases is that the spat ial*tenporal
logic of *Baterial* things leads one to believe that there is
a oaterial object related to every word. In Wittgenstein's
words:
We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look
for it as though it were an object oo*exieting
with the sign.v
low, to try and bring out the confusion ioplioit in this type
of witoh hunt,^® I shall turn from asking *What is the neanlngT*
( 57 )
(aft«r th« apparent model »What does "dog* meanT*) to an alter-
nate oonatruotlon, namely »wiiat la an explanation of meaning »U
The latter formulation ahould unmaak the lapoaalblllty of oon-
oelTlng that a word* a meaning oould hare a tangible referent.
Therefore
» an 'explanation of meaning* la underatood to be a
deaorlptlon of a word* a function In thoee llngulatlo altuatlona
In whloh It oooura; whloh» I bellewe, la a borreot reading of
Vlttgenatein'a position* In the following preaentatlon I shall
pay attention, mainly to the function of words In their warloua
llngulatlo environments.
Before undertaking the descriptive part of this chapter,
1 want to relate an analogy whloh exlata between learning a
language and learning a aport. This analogy ahould prove help-
ful In the present context beoauae It dlatlnguiahea some In-
teresting aspects of language. The similarity rune as follows.
In learning the aport of hunting, say, It Is neoeesary to mas-
ter two things! (a) the physical oo-ordlnatlon needed to oarry
out the activities of riding, shooting, skinning the game,
and eto., and (b) the rules of the aport, whloh are not entirely
separate from (a) but oould oonoelvably be learned without ever
being actually performed, e.g. rules laamed by a blind man
for the sake of theory and not for the sake of praotloe, so
as not to get ehot, or out with a knife, and ao on. Learning
a language also requires the mastery of a skill (a) In the
produot ion of written or vocalised signs* and (b) for using
the language In conformity with the set of rules particular
(&&)
to that languagt. Moreovar, vhon ono finally laarnt the aport
of hunting^ it la iaid that Ita taohnlquaa hava baen aaatarad;
and alailarly *To undaratand a lansuoga aaana to ba naatar of
a taohniqua.*^^ In affaot, than, to know a languaga lapllaa
not only that ona oan aaka sound a, but alao that tha rulaa of
languaga ara undaratood.
Tha body of rulaa In a languaga, i.a, its grawaar, la
not uaad hara in a raatrlotlva aanaa, a»g« as the aaohanios
of aantanoa atruotura alona, but in a auoh broadar aanaa, an-
ooapaaaing an antira *way of llfa*^^ that aurrounda tha Ian-
guaga—for a languaga la a part of its oirounijaoanolaa. That
la to aayt to adaquataly undaratand a languaga, ona mat hara
oultlvatad a knowladga of his anrironaant md ba able to find
hia way about with a oartain fability • It ia a truiaa to af-
firm that to aaparata tha uttaranoaa of a parson from hie
attandant actions ia a dangerous thing. For azaapla, if aoma-
ona riding in tha hunt turns and shouts baok to tha raat *Look
out for the low branoh* whan there are obviously no low branohaa
in sight, no one regards this raisark as important • But if there
ia a low branoh each time ha shouts from up ahead *Look out
for the low hanging branoh* , hia positive exolamation has be-
hind it a whole way of life (tha mastering of a taohnique)
entailing suoh oautions aa the poaaibility of being alappad
in the eye, or puahed from the horse, or aooldantly shooting
oneaelf, and ao on. This example "is meant to bring into promi-
n.no. th. faot that th. aoeaHliuc of Xaneu.«. U part of ui
( 69 )
aotlvlty, or of a form of llfe.*^®
Haro, In this quote, le a rather oonoiee etatenent of
the general theme of this theeie. Its expansion, presently,
shall render it more intelligible, especially when it has the
support of a number of examples. These prowide the illustra-
tive material needed to demonstrate how a word oomes about its
meaning. In eaoh instanoe I shall desoribe some of the oom-
plex oiroumetanoes in which a word is learned. Indeed, I am
reminded tha^ there eire various oiroumstanoea, and not just
one, which is a testament to the fact that none of the desorip-
tions presented below claim to be the description of how a
particular word is learned. Understanding the intricate na-
ture of a language is not an easy (though not an impossible)
task. To use Wittgenstein* a idiom, it is like encountering
**a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know
your way about; you approach the same place from another side
and no longer know your way about.
It is as if ”Our language can be seen as an ancient
city: a mass of little streets and squares, where "A multi-
tude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every
direction*;^® and more times than not ®Xn the actual use of
expressions we make detours, we go by aide roads. We see the
straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it,
b.o.us. it la p.miaa.ntly olo..d.«30 p«rhap» tbaa. ars bom
of th. poaaibl. obub.b of philoaopblo 'dlsqul.tudo'
*pui*l."
aont and Mntal dlaooafort, that beXaagu.r th» phllo.oph.r
( 80 )
vhen ha gata *biuipa* on hla 'undarstanding* from running
*agninat tha llAlta of languaga*^^ in doing philosophy. Ha
Bight ha haard saying to aoBoona on a grand boulavard (aata-
phyaioa) or in a blind allay (aoliptiaa)^^ *1 aon^t fcnow mr
war about and at that tiBS» parhapa, ha would haws pans-
trated to tha "dapth of philosophy. With thase Boat par-
oaptiDla (if slightly ooBplaz) Botaphors in mind, I shall try
to hasp away froB thosa parplazitias ‘‘bassd on a ai sunderstand-
ing**^^ of a word, which alaost habitually issue frou instanoea
of not hawing **oonsidarad its applioation suff ioiantly. Tha
azaaplae of laarning words which 1 SBploy, intend to show "hew
tb* >ord. In qaa.tion m. notunlly u«wt In our
(tl) HOW word, do not obtain mtmixuc—Oonoelva of a situation
in whioh A requests B to fatoh hla a red flower froB a nearby
field. Xf B upholds tha wiaw of a private linguist, ha will
undoubtedly laawa for the field with a rad-inaga ( interohange-
aola with *rad->patoh* or *rad-sansatlon* ) in his Bind, with
whioh ho iatanda to oospare tha flowers of the field. Ha
avontually hopes to ploh a flower tha color of whioh can be
identified with tha rad-iaaga. When this happens, ha will
rush back to A and aay •hare*, handing bin a rad flower.
However, if A aszad B to isagina a rad patoh, oartalnly B'o
taaptation to feel he had a privately stationed, » paradigmatic*
rad-patoh would be called into question, for if ha had to
iaagina a rad patoh, he would first have to oall-up a rad-patoh
( 81 )
(no, 1) as hl8 paradijpa for ooourrenooe of ‘red*, ajyj^ than
actually luaglne (anothor) rod patch (no. 2) to oovor tbooo
oondltlone nooesoary for announolng that ho had loMMslnod what
ho had boon aoked to laagilno. Hot only would B boooao dio-
oonoertod whon ho tried to aooortaln whother or not he had a
rod-patoh ao a paradlgn ( as oppoood to anothor oolor whioh he
appears to call •red*), ho would aleo contract Inourmountablo
hardships in showing: hie colored patch (whatoror it was) to
anyone. There are two things inwolvod here: (i) b*o own rod-
patoh; and (ii) the posBibiXity of his showing someone oloo
what "rod" means.
(i) B*s own red«»patoh .»~It was shown in the last ohapter that
sheltering a private as the basis of a word*e meaning,
is insuff iolent grounds for asoribing eteaning to a word. And
furthermore, that this is brought to the attention of the per-
son who maintains the private language view, when he asks him-
self (as he oould not ask others) questions of the order— *What
does a correct image of this oolour look liket*'^'*’ His failure
to find an answer to questions of this sort is not due to a
lack of imaging ability, but the fact that no last image oould
validate the use of any suooeeding image. An image is an
image; and the verification of one image by another only breeds
fresh images ^pfinitum . This is an inevitable outcome, short
of seeking some sort of Justif ioatlon by "appealing to something
Independent" of Images. But his position does not allow out-
side appeals. (This predicament of private validation is
(Q8)
analogous to th# ona onoountarad In tha praTloua ohaptar.
Tharafora, I thall not rapaat it.) If tha prUata Ilngulat
ays ha actually doas aooapt a prlvata rad-lnaga aa tha basis
for tha aaaning of »rad», ha probably, as Wittganstain points
out, is aaying both (a) that •tha word *rad* naans sonathing
known to awaryona; and in addition (b), for aaeh parson, it
naans sonsthing known only to hin». •{Or perhaps rathari it
rafara to sonathing known only to hin,)*33
It is as if whan I uttarad tha word 1 oast a sidalong
glanoa at tha private sanaation, as it ware in order
to say to nysalf: I know all right what 1 naan by it.
Tha question than arises *Doaa it render tha naaning of *rad"
any olaarar to hold both (a) and (b)T'
B trU» to f11 wh«t tb. r*d.
patch, whioh is inaginad as tha paradlgn for aaoh expression
containing "rad*, is of a oonplataly different oonstitution
from that rad rose in tha garden. Tha rad-sansation and tha
rad rose are decidedly not tha sane thing; and once this is
admitted, it is exceedingly trying to understand how •rad*
in either *Inagina a rad-»Patoh. » or don't inagina a rad»
patch,' or 'Hare is a rad rose'—how aaoh refers to tha sane
rad-sansation that aarvas to give "rad* its raspeotiva naan-
ings. If 'rad' in tha first two axanplas refers to diasinilar
rad-sansations, and if tha rad rose and tha rad-sensation are
fundamentally different things, than there are several ooour-
ranoas of "rad* whioh do not have tha same referent rad-sansa-
tion. But this is not tha kind of argument tha private language
( 63 )
ptreon is anxious to support. To ths oontrary, hs holds that
the red- image is the same for all ooourrsnoss of "red". More-
over, hs doss this at the expense of a number of Inoonsistsnoiss
in his approaoh.
Mo oauss is served by entertaining (b), the idea that
*red* means something private, and irrevocably and indeter-
minately different for eaoh person, as veil as (a), that *red*
means the same thing for every person. The latter idea makes
sense, the former ends in numerous confusions not even the
private linguist oon resolve. Therefore, X shall nov attempt
to shov what happens to *red* in ordinary language, ind this
oan be done by drawing attention to the fact that it is used
muoh in the same way as a carpenter *e tools are used.^ This
state of affairs is not hard to recognise once it is seen that
an explanation of the meaning of **red” entails a desoription
of those occurrences of *red* in various linguistic situations
in the same way in which the use of a carpenter's 'cross out
saw' would be described to an apprentice. Moreover, in order
to give the meaning of *red* it is unneoessary to implicate
a red-sensation— it is the desoription of sevsral instances
36
of its use that ultimately unfolds the meaning of •red».
When 'the meaning of a word* is formulated as 'an explanation
of the meaning of a word'?7 the idea that a private sensation
must be present to bestow meaning on 'red' "drops out of con-
sideration as irrelevant."^® For assuredly it would make no
sense to say that a private sensation constitutes the meaning
( 64 )
of "red*, If the judgaente ae to whether "red" Mane eoaething
or not, are determined by all those who use *red*. ihioh Is
only to say that
if 1 need a justif loation for using a word, it
snist also be one for someone else. 39
On this Tiew it makes no differenoe if the redosensations are
as numerous as the individuals using the word "red"; even if
the sensations are idsntioal, or, irrevooably dissimilar.
None of these oonditions would interfere with *this* or 'that*
be ing ‘red* if everyone agreed that 'this* and *that* were
*red*.^^ That is to say, when *red* is understood as a tool
(with a noteworthy function) in the vast workshop of language,
and is used by everyone for the same work, then the meaning
of "red* is determined by those human beings who agree that
it is what they * aav that is true and false... they agree in
the language they use.*^^
This last remark, however, reveals onoe more the very
thing that the private linguist shows an unwillingness to ao-
oepti agreement with others. To bring into the light a few
other diffioulties having to do with * agreement with others*,
it is interesting to speculate on what would happen if the
private linguist had to falsify his Images. That is, what
happens if he says "falsely that something is red",^^ Wittgen-
stein remarks. In the previous aooount it was noted what
happened when he had to consider the truth of *This is red*
or *Thls is not red* both of whioh generated certain irresolvable
( 66 )
puBslet. But now, If he has to give an explanation oowering
their faleif ioation too, i.e. when 'This is red* is false, and
'This is not red* is false, then he encounters further oonfu-
eions. The expansion of these difficulties X believe can help
to provide a wider understanding of the private linguist's
position, and at the same tine sake one aware of how a word
does not oone by its 'neaning'*
Earlier, it was found that internal feasibility encoun-
tered its greatest difficulties when trying to establish the
truth of 'This is red* and 'This is not red'. The trouble grew
out of two areas: (a) verifying the consistent use of the sane
image on diverse oooasions, and (b) reckoning how "red* in
'This ie not red' means (refers to) a sensation that is not
there, i.e. how "red* means anything at all in such oases.
Presently, in having to account for fals if ioation, he faoes
increased difficulties because: (o) he must clarify the meaning
of "red" in 'This is red' when this is yellow, and also (d)
'red' in 'This is not red' when * Thia is red *
when T H I 8 is yellow * —On the one hand, it might be possible
to say that a slip had been made and that a second chance should
be granted to the speaker who made the mistake. But the pri-
vate linguiet holds that his red-sensation is incorrigible.
Therefore, an endless number of ohances would only announce
that he never knows whether or not he has made a mistake, be-
cause whatever he says red, has to be red. In effect, his
utterances would impart no ' information.
» ^5 As Max Black has
( 66 )
Indloatad in dealing with thie w«py tubjoott
Tha inoorrlgibility of the pure ohaerwation etate-mente ia aohiewed at the ooat of their utter futilitrfor the purposee of ooumnioation or influence .46
Ihua, the aaaailability of the priwate linguist* a position ia
exposed. Certainly he wants to be heard, and to hare his views
understood by others. However, he oan only aoooaplish this
by aobnowledging that "red* has
,
a oowaon meaning; and this does
not grant him the right to continue his espousal of private
language
•
On the other hand, he might tentatively allege that
hie sensations are also la others, i.e. in their minds* If
this were the oase, statements like *I oan feel 4 in other bodies
as well as in my own* would, on the surfaoe, indicate the ae«-
oeptanoe of an agreed usage for *red”, beoause 4 now appears to
be * in others,* However, as Sohliok remarks, the private
linguist's statement, on his own grounds, reduces to *Z oan
feel only ay own 4 la others* which does not imply that 4 la
others*, la the same as their 4 distributively. that has hap-
pened is that the private linguist has merely projeoted a
proto-type of his own 4 into the minds of others; without stating
whether or not others have the same 4 If, on the one hand, the
private linguist should maintain that other people do in faet
exist as well as himself, then the a prioristlo. truth-olaimlng
oharaoter of his assertions about what Ig. and what la
•red" are rendered senseless; and if, on the other hand, he
maintains a position of privileged aooess to the red-sensation
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(whloh is the meaning of •red* for him), then, indeed, it
would be logioally impoaelble for anyone, other than himself,
to know what he meant by »red«. To stand olear of this per-
plexity, Wittgenstein adwises that the private linguist must
reoogniss the meaning of *red» as something other than «a queer
connexion of a word with an object, which he alone possesses.
Realising that this would relieve him of the entanglement ao-
oompanying the claim that
his private impression of i meims that he has
Imagined, in a sense in which p cannot mean
this to others,49
which, in terms of information, most certainly would render i
meaningless, and its use by the private linguist conveys noth-
ing to others.
(d) 'ThU 1. not red’ wb.n T H I B 1. r.d—In so fu m this
case oan be considered by the private linguist, it only pro-
vides him with the reinforcement of bis old problems. Onoe
more he would find that it is questionable how *red* in *This
is not red* could entail a red<»sensation (which is necessary
for *red* in this expression to have meaning). On top of this,
he must show, if only to himself, how *red* has any meaning
when *This is not red* is false, i.e. when T H I 8 red. In
addition, he must tell something is *red*, when be says
it is not. Surely, to assert: * This is not red*, and at the
same time: *This red,* is contradictory in the same way as
it is to assert: » Thie is three sided* and *Thi8 is square*
of the same thing, what I want to bring out hers is that
( 68 )
and "falaa* (in the ea«« fashion as all othsr words in
language) are neaningful^ nainly beoauss it is oustonary to
regard language as a Mans of ooMunioation. That is» to use
Wittgenstein's words » in language there' is an
agreeaent not only in definitions but also ...in
judgaents,50
It is not suff ioient s imply to be in aooord with a person on
a certain verbal definition of *red«, for this does not neo-
oesarily include the ability to enploy 'red' properly in all
its linguistic oontozts.S^ Furtheraiore , to agree in 'judgisents'
means to beoooe aware of the fact that
the sentenoe 'this is not red' has sense only as
a member of a system of language, 53
and to say 'This is red' or 'This is not red', where 'this*
refers to the som thing, must have some hind of meaning if
'it* is in a language. The sense of a sentenoe is ascertained,
neither in company with a prooess of 'introjeotlon' nor by
hypostatising entities that oon only stimulate empty boasts
of 'privileged aeoe&s*,5d but rather by 'looking at the sen-
tenoe as an instrument* or a tool, and appreoiating that 'its
sense is its employment* in a given language
(0) Learnlnig a word .-^In this section I shall first oosaient
upon several factors which seem to be necessary in teaching a
language, and then exemplify the commentary with two illustra-
tions • From eeotion (A) of this chapter, it will be remembered
that th. Mailing of word, is otiaraotsrited a. a "phjrtiognoay";®''
and fro» sootlon (B) that •tanguaga i» an Inetnin.nt*®’’
with
(69)
wbioh this *phy8lognony* nay b« explored. The aethod of ex-
ploration le to aek *0n wbat oooaeion, for wbat purpoee, do
we say tbie":^8.-to examine juet *bo« tbe worde in queetion
ax aotwIlY u««<l la lanmiMta . xn oonsaqu«no« of ob- '
eerring and aeking bow they are used, it ie possible to learn
tbeir meanings.^ As a result of these explorations littgen-
etein finds that it beoomes Inoreaeingly evident that
I I
Our oriterion for someone* s saying something to
himself is wbat be tells us and tbe rest of bis
behaviour; and ,we only say that someone speaks
to himself ordinary sense of the words,
be can speak .o*
He further notes, however, that the above method oan be de*
struct ive, as well ae oonstruotive, if it is not oautioned
that many times the role of words
in our language (is more involved) .. .than we are
tempted to think; 63
often being employed as *different instruments* in our lan-
guage but nevertheless
lniitrum»nt» otUir&ot»n«»d ^ tbolr
Thus, in his programme which observes the use of *the multi-
plicity of kinds of word and sentence*®^ in their actual lan-
gu€ige situations, it is believed by Wittgenstein that the
Noommon criteria—the criteria, i.e. whioh give our words their
common meaning"®^ are necesaarily delineated. The criteria
elicited in this fashion provide the means for discovering if
a given word has been learned, i.e. is being used in accordance
with the public standard.
( 70 )
It ift often said that learning a language ie lUe learn-
ing a game which ie to be played with others. Moreover, it is
usually held that a person has learned a gaM when it has been
mastered; whioh is educed from the manner in whioh the game
is praotioed. There is an analogy with words whioh Wittgenstein
draws here, between learning a game and learning a language:
"to understand a sentence means to understand a language*. To
, be of
understand a language means to^^maeter^a technique."”® it di-
rectly follows then, that any aoknovledgement to the effect
that a word has a certain significance (a * meaning* in this
instance) implies the general rule that "The use of the word
ip practice ie its meaning."®^ that is, the meaning of a word
ie its manifest biography, revealed by observing its diverse
employment in a plethora of linguistic circumstances. To ap-
praise properly whether or not a word has been learned "in
different oiroumstanoes we apply different criteria",®® because
"There are different kinds of Justification"®® applicable to
the diverse occurrences of that word.*^® rurthemore, exactly
what it is that
people accept as Justification— is shewn by how
they think and live .71
Therefore, Wittgenstein goes on, in order to "commapci a olear
view of the use of our words it is obvious that a thorough
interpolation of each of them "in pertain contexts^".^^ cir-
oumsoribing them, would explicitly disclose »the use of our




ato?TT« iHL liS. S&Ul »ord wans i’’’* Thli l« olaarly to
9 ttxftt tho div#r89 Insti&noos or & word*s ooourrono# h%To
to be obeerred and ooapared* Briefly then, end to elaborate
on vhat hae been eald in the first section (A) of this chapter,
of language is part of an aotiyity, or a fora
of life,*'^^ i.e. "to laagine a language aeans to iasgine a
fora of life*;^^ and "if ve had to naae anything whioh is the
life of the sign (the sentenoe), we should hare to say that
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it was its use ." for "Ewery sign by itself peeas dead, what
giyes it life?—In use it is aliye ."*^^
(i) illus.
I
tration brings into play those f&otors neoessary in teaohing
a word such as "red" to someone. 1 now assume, tentatiyely,
that one auet know how to operate in a language in order to
understand the terms of that language. Furthermore, that when
aeked
How do I know that this colour ie red ?-«»It would be
an answer to says "I have learnt English".'^
The point being that to "keep on steering towards ths idea of
the priyate oetenaiye definition"®^ only direots one to that
seemingly untenable oonoept of iseanlng wherein "One thinks
that learning a language consists in glwing naaes to objects.
This course directed towards a priyate kind of tagging, deeply
ingrained in our culture, seems to be based upon the oredo
62
that m&i mikU. ftiS&Ur & !.»• som
font of .ntlty; upon our being eager to go on and Inclet that
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all words art naoss of this sort. This position adwooatos that
•naaing is southing llks attaohlng a labsl to a thlng«B3 often
oharaoterlsed by the meemlngless assuaption, as Wittgenstein
so beautifully puts It, that naalng is «aoae remarkable aot
of mind, as If it were a baptlsa of an object."®^ Here, when
there are such 'baptisms* parading as the actual oonoepts of
meaning, "language Rose on hollday"^^ of the aost costly type.
Perhaps X should pause for a moment and see what happens
when It Is aeeuaed that language Is a oonoatenatlon of words
whloh art 'naaee* In the above, reproachable sense. I shall
set out what I consider to be four oonsequenoes which result
when such a position Is upheld, (a) If learning a language is
constituted solely by an 'oooult naming (or baptismal) process',
then "a word has no iieanln>^ If nothing corresponds to It."®®
But this Is surely an Improper analysis of meaning because not
only, as has been shown, does the incorrigible nature of a
private referent lend a word meanlnglese, but (b) a publio label
also would be devoid of meaning without a publio referent. That
is to say, when the meaning of a word Is Its 'bearsr', then
the ontological status of that bearer Is essential (must be
Identical to) to the aeanlng of the word. Take the oase of
'Mr. W. N.', certainly
When Mr. W. W. dies one saye that the teara r of the
name dies, not that the meaning dies.®'
Clearly, after 'Mr. M. K*' passes away his family might wish
to speak of him, yet they would be unable to, should they ao-
oept a naive name-objeot concept of aeanlng, because then when
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th« b«ar*r out of oxisteneo, to too, in offoot, dots th«
moaning of the word. (Ill) a timllar inatanoo would ooour
with regard to the name of a tool 'll* In a prlmltlwe oooloty.
Does the breaking of *K* entail the non-exlatenoe of *1* if
there le no expreaelon In that language for »M le broken? • Thue,
when 'K* le broken, and A aske a to bring *l», what would B do?
Would B bring •»•? B, I think, would not know what A waa re-
ferring to.^^ Finally (It), auppose A aald to B 'bring me a*
and B had never heard the word 's' employed In the language
before. Certainly there would be a perplexity about B'a ooun-
tenanoe as he groped around for some reaction to A' a utterance;
Indeed, B might not respond at all, feeling A had made an un-
mannerly sound.
Again, the non-^exlatenoe of an Immediate bearer In the
name->bearer oonoept of meaning leads to Inaction on the part
of those who are confronted with the four eltuatlona just men-
tioned. In summary then. It appears plausible to assume that
^ la>rg< class of oasea—though not for all— In
which we employ the word "meaning* It can be defined
thus! the meaning of a word le Its use In the lan-
guage. And the meaning of a name is sometimes ex-
plained by pointing to Its bearer .
But, If there jjg, a name-bearer relation, that which the name
signified must be indeetruotlble; for It muet be possible to
desorlbe the state of affairs in which everything destructible
is destroyed. And euoh a description would necessarily con-
tain the name of that which was destroyed, therefore, the
name oannot be destructible In the sense of being broken, dying.
( 74 )
or in any other way paeelng out of ezietenoe. »l «u»t not uw
off the branch on whloh I an elttlng.'®® low I ehall return
to the first illustration.
lo teaoh the word •red*, with the above oonelderatlon
of the 'naae-bearer’ oonoept of aeanlng In Bind, one night
well proceed along the following lines. Initially flttgen.teln
msntlons that
What one gsnsrally calls •explanations of the meaning
definitIone!Sl“’^*
divided into verbal and ostensi^
A nere verbal definition of •red", regardlese of whether that
definition included »red», would end in an obvious oiroularity,
going from ‘verbal definition* to ‘verbal definition', in
like manner, an ostensive definition alone has trouble in asking
itself olear. For example, eay eoaeone were taught the use
of the word "red* merely by means of an ostensive definition.
First a red patoh would be pointed to, then maybe a white patch
and/or several other primary oolora, in hopes of making a dis-
tinct ion between the red one and the others* Yet, if after
some time of auoh pointing, the request '^3how me a red one*
results in the designation of a blue one, or a white one, then
it is olear that a purely ostensive definition of *red*, at
leaet in this case, was for some reason a failure. Perhaps
the original pointing was taken to mean the patch itself, or,
the design of the patoh;®^ for, as Wittgenstein suggests,
There are oases where experience teaches us that a
person is not able to oarry out an order, eay, of
the form "Bring me x" if he did not see what was
in oommon between the various objeote to which 1
pointed as an explanation of "x".®3
( 76 )
However
» in oonbinatlon, the verbal and oateneive definltlona
produce a situation in which appeal after appeal for a 'red*
objeot reaulta in the oetentation of that red object; and be-
cause of this,
L say that he has seen the ooau&on feature of
the objects X showed hia.^4
Therefore, in virtue of observing his actions when a request
is made to point out the red object, it is logical to assume
that his **Carrying out the order is now the criterion for his
having understood.
The conditions for learning the language just described,
are of a most elementary nature. That *red* corresponds to
a certain color on a public chart, and that it can be pointed
to correctly, can be viewed as a type of assimilation in which
the patch (on the chart) Is
an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of
odour.. ..it is not something that is represented, but
is a means of representation. .. .when we name it ^
uttering the word (*red”)s this gives this object (the
red patch) a role in our language game; it is now
a means of representation.^^
However, the criterion for understanding *red», from observing
the proper designation of a red objeot eaoh tisie it is requested,
allowe only for a most limited use of 'red*. Subtle shades of
red might be indistinguishable, i.e. meaningless; a *red
Indian*, or a 'Russian red,' or a 'red herring* all might pre-
sent difficulties if the red exemplar (above) were used in oon-
neotion with these words.
To illustrate this point, suppose 'red* had, so far ae
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was known, two funotions in a glTon language. One was for rs-
ferring to a spsoifio color, and the other to designate a par-
tioular person of the U.8.S.R. governing body. In part, it
should be noted that the words in this last sentenoe provide
a partial criterion for judging the aeaning of *red* in eaoh
respsotive case, which is to indicate, fittgsnstein says, that
"As the criterion for a word's having two meanings, we way
use the fact of there being two explanations given for a word."^^
In the case of the color, pointing at it and verbalising about
it, serve as the oriteria for its use; the same is also true
for the Soviet politioian. Theee two usee of "red” are, then,
two meanings for the word 'red*. The explanations aot as para-
digms by whioh these two meanings are understood, they record
instances. However, "red” would only have these two uses, no
other red politioian than the one pointed to, nor any other
instance of the color red oould fall within the range of the
above criterion* It is in this way that the use of "red* is,
so far, relatively limited.
(ii) iiiu.tr*tion of LarntM:; * p>in word—Th« ..oond ex-
ample brings into play those factors necessary in teaching a
word having to do with pain. To have to teaoh such words may
appear, at first, somewhat odd, beoauss during one's life pain
is certainly encountered without being given the word for their
hurting ('paining')* That is to say, it is only too plausible
to assume that one oould speed through life without knowing
what "red” meant, and never be the worse for it; but this is
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not truo of opain*. In the oaee of "red*, onoe I know the
word I oan reoogniee »red* thing*. Certainly, if i know the
naae of a pain, thla doe* not create the lloenee to *ay that
new pain* are reoogpilted that went unnoticed before, that ap-
pear* to be a dletinotlon, however, between color word* and
pain word* (In so far as pain* eeaw *oloeer to hone*) oan
easily direct one Into trouble. For where it now eeene reason-
able to accept the thesis that It Is false that the meaning of
"red* stems from a sensation which 1* harboured In the Inmost
reaches of one*s own mind. It hardly seem* to follow that pain,
which Is by nature particular to the person 'paining*, oan
be a matter of public determination In the same way that color
words oan. nevertheless » as will now be shown, pain 1* no
different. To demonstrate the connection between "pain” and
"red” I shall postulate a situation analogous to that In which
the private linguist might maintain that pain Is private.
Supposing k said to B that he had a wicked pain, and B
sympathised with A'* hurting. After a few moments A think*
6 does not really appreciate the extent of his (A**) palnful-
V
ness; and finds out that B li figuring A'* pain on the model
of his own (B's) pain. A contend* that this Is Impose Ible,
for It entail* that B would have to maintain something like
...I have to Imagine pain which 1 ^ not feel on the
model of the pain whloh 1 ^ feel 98
(which Is slightly confusing, upon some reflection); and A goes
on to give B three reason* why It Is Impossible for B to under-
stand his (A*s) terrible pain, If B continues to hold the
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position he has Just nsntionsd.^O (a) In the first plaoe, if
B has preTioualy had 4 (sensation of pain) and usss this as a
model for understanding A»a condition, then B can only use 4
as a model when B feels 4>^^ Clearly, howerer, it is k who
is in pain, i*e» claims to feel 4^ and not B who says he feels
fine; therefore B oould not possibly Itnow how k felt, (ii) Or,
granting that B felt 4 too, oould he not project it into the
same region in which A claims his 4 res idee T This would be a
feat, and ewen if B oould carry out this remarkable type of
projection, he still would not have a more precise understand-
ing of A's 4t beoause A'e ^ would, in fact, be only B*s pro-
jected (iii) A then strengthens hie argument with the
claim that if B uses his own 4 me the example for knowing how
he (A) feels; and if B oan only use hia own 4 when he feels 4^
and if B claims not to feel 4$ then, beoauee B'e feeling 4 is
essential for knowing how A feels, it is therefore inconsistent
for B ever to sav he knows bow badly off A XS feeling. In
other words, if B uses his own ^ as a model of A's pain, and
B does in fact say he also feels 4» B's 4, even if it is pro-
jected, is still not A's Mo^^over, there ie always the
problem of Judging if B's 4 ie as intense as A's. With these
three reasons laid out, A then feels thoroughly satisfied with
his dialeotios; in faot, he tells B he thinks he has let him
off easily, for aside from not being able to recognise the
'same* 4 as it occurred in him (B),102 b would also end up
uttering non—sensei Wittgenstein out the latter point this ways
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Th« propQgltlon "I don»t know vhethwr I or aoMonw
•Ise is In pain" would be a logical product, and
one of Its factors would bti "I don’t know whether
I am in pain or not"—and that is not a significant
proposition .103
Heedless to eay, fi is perplexed, having operated in the
preceding fashion^ in regards to pain at least, during his
entire life. He ooaplains that A's thesis appears to end in
saying that pains theaselves are nothing, whereas B wants to
hold, that each time he has *by golly’ he has something,
whether or not it is the same thing each time, and whether or
not A ever had the sane A now tries to show B how it
is that he is being tormented by questions about his own (B’s)
4 (though it appeare to B that he is being toraented by quee>
tions of A's That is, it is quite evident that B hae
"a preconceived idea to whioh reality must oorreeponci" ,106
and with whioh reality does not correspond. This dichotomy
causes B to feel something is wrong; his only solace seems to
be that at least ^ (B) knows that ’come what nay’ : when he
has he hae it .107 a also tells A that he wants to have it
both waye, and that this is especially true when A says about
pain that
It is not a something, but not a nothing eltherl
The oonolusion was only that a nothing would serve
Just as well as a something about whioh nothing
could be said .108
However, A merely retorts that a private model of ^ serves no
significant purpose; and that in B’s expression of it the
words are to be incorporated into a language,
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The IndlTldual words of this lakaguage are to refer
to what oan only he known to the person epeaklng;
to his isysediate prirate sensations. So another
person cannot understand the lania^uage . 109
But B wants to know how he oan learn about the use of
the word *pain*. A obliges hia by clarifying the prior point
on 'something* and 'nothing* by explaining that quite often
«e feel as if we had to penetrate phenomenal our
inwestigation, however* is directed not towards
phenomena. . .llO
rather* the investigation has a much different emphasis than
that which would auske one search for 'phenomena* • To explain
this to B* A goes on to say that the tendency is to take some«
thing like B's pain* and to
predicate of the (pain) what lies in the method of
representing it. Ill
As an example of this A shows B* how B had taken 'pain* to be
something substantial like a truck or a pin; beoause he (B)
could predicate of pain such things as 'it throbs'* or 'it
pricks'; and in both instances* B is in the spell of a 'mis*,
leading designation* As for the former* the 'it' makes
it look like there is* in fact* something there* and in the
latter the 'it* makes it look like there is a plaoe* some lo»
oat ion where the 'pain* ie« But regarding 'pain'«**A maintaine
that they would both be better off letting
what we observe ... be what the i<^d meansvBMHWMWWSMMWSSMW WSSWlW mMSMSlIWSmi «SMmi 4HSHVHBMB
moreover, that "the subjeot of pain is the person who gives it
expression* whioh is neither an obsoxirs entity* nor a
eeoret plaoe. This is a major point in favor of the method
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of invoatlgation whioh k wants B to adopt.
Tha oonoapt of a parapiououa rapraaentatlon la of
fundaaantal aignlfloanoa for ua. 4 parapiououa rap-
raaantation produces juat that understanding which
oonaiata in *aaaing oonnaxione* . It earmarks the
form of account wa give, the way wa look at things. 115
Thareforai the method by whioh A propoaaa to daaoriba to B
how ha ia oonfuaad, is to question uttaranoaa like *1 have
and ask "how ie this aantanoa applied—that is, in our ewary-
day language? After all, says A, "You learned the oonoaot
*pain* whan you learned language. «^17 And oertainly if there
is * something*, as B would like to say— if there is, so to
say, some objeot *pain', Vittgenstein declares that
t.lU obl.ot anything
The question now is "How do words refer to sensations? *,
whioh is to ask "how does a human being learn the meaning of
the names of sensations?—of the word *pain* for example.
These questions momentarily deceive B, who interprets them as
reflecting on his old means of recognising pain. He cautions A:
Other people cannot be said to learn of ay sensations
only from my behaviour.—for cannot be said to learn
or them. I have them . 130
A *begs off* an immediate answer, but promises one if B will
follow him in a short example illustrating how the connection
between the word *pain* and *that pain* comes to pass.
Imagine a child learning to tell its parents that some-
thing is painful. At first, and no one would deny this, ths
ohild is in pain when it ories, waves its hands, turns rsd,
and makes horrible faoes; but the ohild has not learned to
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ay »lt hurts* y#t. Th« tigns the child mates are called
*prlaitlire« or 'natural expressions' of pain; and—so A tells
B—when they talk about such sif^s they shall refer to them
as 'pain behavior'. Doctors are necessarily more apt in de-
tecting signs of pain» i.e. they know more signs, and can tsll
if a child is not well when otherwise the illness might go un-
detected—but this does not mean that the doctor gives the
child pain that was not there before, when he or she indicates
certain signs of pain. That is to say, with the saae child
present before the doctor and the mother, the doctor just sees
more. In fact, that is why people go to doctors, says a.
Mow, as the child matures the parents teach the child
new 'pain behavior', and quite often this is in the form of
words. Thus, when the child has a piece of dust in its eye,
after reaching a certain age, the child says 'it hurts' and
may even help with some purely ostensive demonstrations, where
the child previously just oried without giving any indication
as to where or what, and nothing short of a complete examine*
tion would have revealed what all the noise signified. It
is, thsn, perspiouous that the declaration 'it hurts' replaces
the aftermentioned primitive pain-behavior. That is to say,
the verbal expression of oain replaces crying
and does not describe it.i21
I.e. the word 'hurts' does not predioate anything of 'it' be-
cause there is no object 'it*—it hurts is the method of rep-
resenting 'pain'.
In this way A elucidates how it is wrong to suppose
that one should "try to us© languaige to get between pain and
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lt« «xpr«88ion".^^^ The words for pain, after all, art Just
that! words for pa1r « Tbt language of •pain* it oonstitutad
by thoBt Bl^ns whloh, in adults, run ahead of the aort dtaon-
Btrativo txprtBBions of pain. A mature person, however, in
extreme pain, oan ory, yell and naice noise, with a ooamotlon
equal to that of any child, if not better, for the adult knows
how to get attention better than an unknowing ohild. Suddenly
B eeems pleased. Bailee from ear to ear, and announoei that
the only reason he did not know A*s was really giving A a
hard time, was because A did not show any other sign than to
say *I hare , whereas most people whom B has met with 4 have
not been in very good shape, most of them get all so-and-so.
Well, A has to admit that he was deceiving B, and tells him
that it probably did not hurt as bad as he was 'making out*
(note the telling nature of this expression in the light of
what has been said about 'pain behavior').
B, however, continues to have a few reservationfi, and
he returns to his unanswered question, repeating it he eays:
certainly, he does not learn from his own behavior, that he
himself ie in pain. He (B) either has pain or he does not havt
pain—and that is that. Exactly, says A, seeing that B has
maneuvered himself directly into his (A* a) hands.
The truth ist it makes sense to say about other people
that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say
it about myself. XB3
B then Imiuedlately realises that »he cannot be in error as to
whether he is In pain; he oannot say 'My leg hurts,' by mistake.
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any aort than he oan groan by letalce.*'^^^ If b has pain,
and hie etatenent to thle effect le 'incorrigible*, and if the
pain is bad enough so that he needs help, B adaita that hie
ezpreesion will inprore proportionately. states that if B
is still unclear about the concept of 'pain*, he would go on
to show B nore; that is, to
teach him to use the words by means of
PfaQtlQe .*»*And when X do this 1 do not
oommunioate less to him than 1 know myself .126
A then goes on to describe how he would teach B the wooabulary
of pain*
Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him
with a pin and saying; *See, that*s what pain
ist* This explanation, like any other, he might
understand right, wrong, or not at all. And he
will show which he does by his use of the word,
in this as in other oases. 136
ilhen B does use the word with a certain continuity, according
to the accepted conventions, this will be evidenced by hie
practice, which, A says, looking in his dictionary, perspio->
uouely instantiates that B has mastered a technique^- in this
case, the use of pain words.
(D) CritdrUi judelmt tfa* l*«,rn>4 word—Th« purpoi. of tbli
section is to set out a few «*sign posts"; as Wittgenstein says,
"A rule stand^\here like a sign post. "^27 xhese sign posts
are to aesist A in Judging whether or not 6 has learned a word
which A has been trying to teach B. That is, when the meaning
of a word is taught by A to B, A would like to have some means
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whereby h« oan b« sure that ha h&s aoooDpIlshad aon#thing. Thua,
should B maraXy point at» and say, tha saaa tnings that k
pointad at and said whiXa ha was taaohing tha naaning of a word
to 3, all that oould ba aeoartainad from B's praforaanoa, i.a.
tha raaults of A* a taaobing, would ba that B was a wary good
aiaio. Tharafora, tha oritarion for datarnining whathar or
not B has laamad a word frosi A onist bo sora than A*s witnassing
a raoapitulation of tha wary things ha did in toaohing B.
Maloola brings out azaotly what would ba raquirad to satisfy A
whan ha notas that it is only whan
you hava suocaadad in bringing to Bind what it is
that would show that ha had gras pad your taaohing,
that you haws alioited tha criterion for thair use, 126
i.a. than A has alioitad tha wherawithall to judga whathar tha
meaning (usa) of tha word has been learned by B. And mors times
than not, this inoludas using a word in situations other than
those whioh ware used in tha teaohing situation; for, as Witt<>
ganstain mentions, in regards to the diverse ooourranoes of
tha same word, *in different oiroumstanoes wa apply different
oritaria**;l39 which is to say that "Thera are vary different
kinds of juBtifioation”!^^ for the use of tha same word in
different situations, furthermore, Wittgenstein suggests that
What is essential is to see that tha same thing oan
corns before our minds whan we hear the word and the
application still ba different. Has it the sama
meaning both times? I think wa shall say not. 131
Here again, it is seen that when "The usa of the word ^
jraotioe is its meaning", 132 the ability to Judge tha proper
use, ^ some sort of criterion which tolls if a certain practioe
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is in aooordanos with the oustoaary oonvsntions or not.
koreosTor, this oritsrion, as I shall bring out shortly,
is in no way oonnsoted with a privats iwags in A's hsad, hid-
dsn froB the public in such a wanner that only A would be able
to tell if B had learned a certain word. In the light of this,
A is not plagued by the question: *How do we oompare iaagesT*^^3
(Sspeoially private iwages). He only seeks to establish what
would satisfy his aooeptanoe of the faot that B had grasped a
particular word which he (a) tried to teach B. A is not in
the least concerned with how B knows the word; A finds that
all that really natters is that B uses the word (whatever it
is) according to various convent ions. ^34 Certainly, if the
Bseaning of a word is its use in a language and not some occult
isiage (entity or pbenomenon), one is relieved of the search
for an obscure entity which would detersine the aeaning of a
word. Therefore, one has only to establish the rules for a
word's use, i.e. a criterion for its use, to be able to know
whether or not that word has been learned by another. This,
as was previously nentioned, is aanifest by what B says and
does;^35 and has nothing to do with an iaage. As Wittgenstein
puts it, this is not a oase of "analysing a phenoaenon. . .but
a oonoept...and therefore the use of a word.»l‘36 He goes on
to Mention, however, that there is a danger in construing
"meaning* as a concept, for one is then tempted to lapse back
into the old habit, where
You have a new oonoeption and interpret it as seeing
a new object. You interpret a gramoatioal movement
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made by youraelf at a quaai^phyaioal pbanoaenon wbiob
you art obaerrlng.137
Wlttganstoin tuggeatt that one auat not be led to oonoelving
that oooult Isagea are the "aeaninga" of worda, but rather that
aeaninga are oonoepte, free froa the atlgaa of being quaai-
phyaioal phenoaena which inevitably bringa about oonfueiona
and Buddlea*
In a Boat oonoiae way, Wittgenatein holda that for *red*^^^
and "pain*^^9 it would be enough to eay that one baa learned
their Meaning in virtue of the fact that one had learned the
English language* That is to say, to inagine a language, ia
to inagine a way of life;^^0 or, in other worda,
of language ia part of an activity,
or oTaTora of life .141
However, these renarks of littgenstein are presently a bit too
eoapaot for current purposes, although they do indeed oonvey
the basic principles of hia position. X shall now develop
Vittgenatein's view in auoh a Banner that the notion of cri-
terion formation, or exactly: what ia a criterion?, will be-
oome clearer* Toward this end 1 shall try and do two thinga:
(a) show how one might come about recognizing the oriterion
for a word's use; and then (b), mention briefly the requirements
of an ideal language which quite often seem implicit in language.
(a) Criterion.—AS was mentioned above, Wittgenatein maintains
that to *»ooamand ^ Clear view of the use of our worda, it
is essential to realize that there are "different kinds of
Justif Ication"^^^ for the use of the same word in various aituationa.
( 66 )
Furthermore, that "In different olroumstanoee we apply dif-
ferent or Iterla"^^ for aeoertalnlng the warlous meanlnge (ueea)
of the same word* Thue, Wittgenstein points out that
The word "agreement" and the word "rule” are related
to one another, they are oouslns. If X teach anyoM
the use of the one word, he learns the use of the
other with It. 145
And further on he says that "the use of the word *rule* and
the use of the word *same* are Interwowen* From these
etatements. It Is not difficult to see that If people agree
within the language they use, and If learning a language la
to learn a fora of life, then the concept of meaning which
construes the employment (use) of a word as Its meaning, l.e.
the employment of a word Is Ite "sense or meaning, neces-
sarily depends on warlous rules or agreed-upon*publlo-oonwen»
tlone as sign posts for the proper use of the warlous words
In a language. These agreed-upon-publlo-conwentlons are the
•common orlterla««the criteria, l.e. which glwe our words their
148
oomnon meanings . . • •
"
Keeping In mind that "It le what human beings saw that
Is true and false; and they agree In the language they use, "149
which bn Wittgenstein's wlew "Is not agreement In opinions but
In form of llfe,"^^^ he holds that In order to come upon the
meaning of a word
One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to
looK q^t Its use and learn from that.
That le, to establish a criterion for a word's use, which Is
to say, to establish that which would allow A to proclaim that
( 89 )
B hud l6&r&6d the vord A had taught A naad only oontldor
the application of that word (e.g. «red* or *pain*, eto.)
guffiolantly» to aee *0n what oooaaion, for what purpoee, do
wo Bay thU«.^^^ The reaults of hie enquiry will giro A the
rules for judging B's ahlllty to use that word in diwerse In-
stances; and Aore than likely » rules that are In excess of those
which B evldenoed In the original teaching situation. In the
end, what B accepts as the justlfloatlon for his own use of
a word, what he aanlfests as his understanding of the meaning
of a word, shall be shown by how he thinks and lives. por,
as Wittgenstein points out,
If language Is to be a means of oommunioation there
BUAst be agreement not only In definitions but also...
in judgments. 154
And this is the twofold agreement which oharaoterlses the ori*
terla for a word's use. Thus, It is more than the mere wit-
nessing of a reoapltulation of the teaching situation; more
than just the mimiolng of a verbal definition; more than just
the mlmioing of an ostenslve definition. The orlterla for a
word's use in diverse Instances are elicited from **ob8erving*^^B
the biography of that word, l.e. observing the "behaviour
of the person who uses the vord, and, as It were, ohronloling
those instances. The applioatlon of this information is what
A uses in deciding if B has learned the word he has been taught,
(b) Ideal language .—As soon as one mentions "rules" or "cri-
teria" It is believed that one attempts to set out "to refine
or ooaplste the system of rules for the uss of our words in
( 90 )
unheard-of and thus to reetriot the uee of words,
to reetriot their Beanings. The word "rules* or "oriteria*
seem to imply the imposing of limits or boundaries wherein a
word oan be used, suoh that a word would only be able to be
used in those ways which the rules declared possible. Tet
Wittgenstein asserts that he is not trying to establish " the
order in our knowledge of the use of language," but, rather,
to show that language is not modeled after aui ideal "oaloulus",
and that such an ideal is impossible. Referring to this ideal,
he says
When we believe that ve must f ind ... order , must find
the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissat-
isfied with what are ordinarily oalled "propositions”,
"words ", "8igne "
•
The proposition and the word that logio deals with
are supposed to be something pure and olear-out.
And we rack our brains over the nature of the real
slgn*X&8
He continues to expose the 'normative* understanding of the
function of language by noting that
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the
sharper becomes the oonfliot between it and our
requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logio
waa, of oouraa, not a reauXt of inyeatlgatlopi It
was a requirement.) The oonf liot Deoomes intoler-
able; the requirement is now in danger of becoming
empty.—We have got on to slippery ice where there
is no friction and so in a certain sense the condi-
tions are ideal, but also, Just beoause of that, we
are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need
friction . Back to the rough ground*. 169
Thus, so often there is the desire to talk, to say something,
hut the restriotion incurred in the application of strict rules
of meaning, make for nothing but slipping, perhaps being anal-
ogous to circular talking, or conversations which are extremely
( 91 )
as they art partiouiar to ont apaolfio area of thought,
fron which they oaxmot dlworge without jeopardising their Mean-
ing. Moreower, the ideal language whioh is supposed to be
(or refleot) the *etruoture of the real world* is but a nan
made requirement, as Wittgenstein indioatee above, whioh has
been foroed upon language, and upon a close inspection
fe see that what we oall "eentenoe* and "language*
have not the foraal unity imagined. .. .160
For Wittgenstein avere that all in all *0ur ordinary use of
language oonforas to this standard of exaotness only in rare
oases. *161
fhiles, or criteria, have a threefold oharaoter in Witt-
genstein* s programme, (i) There are tines when one proceeds
by definite rules; (ii) times where *we make up rules as we
go along* ;1®2 and (iii) times where *we alter then—as we go
along. *163 The point being that no^only do words occur in
different oiroumstanoea, but they ooour in new oirouastanoes,
ones foreign to previous uses of a word; and, to repeat,
What is essential is to see that the same thing can
come before our minds when we hear the word and the
application still be different. Has it the sane
meaning both tiMs? X think we shall say not. 164
Here then, in seeing ^how the words in question §£<2. actually;
used ia language there is the tendency to notice that
there exists no ideal way of expressing so-and-so, in fact,
there are many ways, each depending on the factors partiouiar
to the situation, i.e. the people involved, the subject matter
under discussion, the purpose for the discus eion and so on.
( 02 )
Th«r«for6, tb« siL ideal language, has only a United
application, e.g. in natbeaatioe and in some of the aore theo-
retical 80ienoee;id6 and ordinary language it aore flexible
than ie usually appreciated, enooapaaaing, for a single word,
several instances each of vhioh deaand separate rules for judging
their proper use in eaoh instance, Rsaeabering, however, "that







3. BB. p. 35t *1 oalX *8ynptoiB* a phonoMnon of vbloh ax*
parianoa has taught ua that it ooinoidad in aona way or
othar, with tha phanomanon which ia our dafining ori-
tarion....wa ahall aaaiXy ba pareuadad to dafina tha
word by aeana of what^ according to our firat uaa, waa
a ayoapton.*
4. 86. p. 1; of., PI. 340, *0ne oannot guaaa how a word
funotiona.
5. Tha uae of doubla quotas around eingXa words Xika *rad*,
*pain*, ’’dog", ato., maane that auoh words ara mareXy
to ba ragardad ae ''words'*, l.e. those mounds of ink.
6* 89. p. 3X
•
7. BB. p. 31; of., PX. 95.
6. 88. p. 34.
9. 98. p. 5.
10. PI. 109.
II. Bote that in *Vhat is a dog?* and *What is an explanation
of (the word) **dog**T*, there is little appreoiable dif*
feranoa; and one would probably gat the same answer to
both queationa. Howawer, note tha difference in *What
ia a dog?* and *fhat ia the meaning of "dog*?*, and
*Wbat does an explanation of tha meaning of the word
”dog*, look like?*; in the latter phrase tha subtle
point of tha new wittgansteinian formulation comes
out, for hare there is no longer the tendency to point
at a somatic dog.










































PI. 366, of., 251.
PI. 373.
PI. 274.
M. Sohliok, "Meaning and Verif ioation" in HeadingL ip
Phllo«ophio&l AMLlyalg (N«w Tork: Appl.ton-O.ntur;-
Croft, 1949), p. 163: “Shen I see a green aeadow the
* green* ie deolared to be a oontent of ny ooneoiouenese,
but it certainly ie not inside my head. Inside my skull
there is nothing but my brain; and if there should liap-
pen to be a green spot in ay brain, it would obwiously







40. W.V. Q^lne, "Senantios and tha Philosophy of LanguaM*
In tht fbllo,ophy of (Urbuut
University of Illinois Press » 1962 /• sd. L. Linsky,
p. 199: “The useful ways in whioh people ordinarily
talk or seeiB to talk about ttsanings boil down to two:
of meanings, which is signifioanoe, and
sameness of meaning, or synonymy .... The problem of ex*
plaining these adjectives * significant* and * synonymous*
with some degree of olarity and rigor**preferably, as
I see it, in terms of behavior**ie as difficult as it
is important. But the explanatory value of special and
irreduoible intermediary entities called meanings is
surely illusory.”
41.
PI. 241; of., W.V. Quine, ford yid Object (Hew York:
John Wiley 4 Sons, 1980), p. 264, "any subject ive talk
of mental events proceeds necessarily in terms that are
acquired and understood through their associations, di-
rect or indirect, with the socially observable behavior
of physical objects.”
42. PI. 429.
43. N. Ualoolmr oa. oit .. p. 534, develops the argument for








M. Black, Problems ,of Analysis , op. dt. . p. 78.
Again 1 refer to the logic of an argument of Sohliok,








Sohliok. OP. Pit ., p. 163: ”The mistake of locating
con*
soiousnesa or mind inside the body ( * in the head*),
which has been called »introj action” by H. Avenarius,
is the main source of the difficulties of the
so-called
* mind-body problem*. By avoiding the error of i»tr^
jection we avoid at the same time the idealistic fallacy





























PI. 344; and also it It noted btrt tbat *btbaYior*
it uttd, it it not to bo tquatod with Wattonicu:i ptyob»-
logioal bobaTiorita, but toisotbing vuob broader (*tran-
toonding* , perhapt) in wbiob one it to onYitage an
entire way of life; tbit it beat brought out by Wittgen-
ttein when be tayt, in bio rather apboriatio ttyle, in
PI. 472, "The oharaoter of the belief in the uniformity
of nature oan perhapt be teen aoet oleaxly in the oaae
in wbiob we fear what we ezpeot. Nothing oould induoe
me to put my band into a flame—-although after all it
OQly in the oaat that I hare burnt mytelf*; and it
would only be OUR way of life that would make the
atatement *Don*t put your fingers on the etOYot* mean*
ingful.
PI. 162.
BB. p. 67; the underlining it mine.
PI. 33.






PI. 84; of., F. Waitmann, Op. oit.. pp. 117-44, for a
timilar idea on Yariout modet ox juatifioatlon of the























91. BB. p. 1
93. J. Bentb
his Logl wh«n he says *Xt is evident, however, that
great alstakee aay frequently ooour in learners ' ainde
in these oaeee—if, for instance, all the things repre-
sented as being in notion happen to be red , and all
those whioh are spoken of as being ^ rest are white.
he Bay just as well attach to the words I .aove tne
aeaning red , and to these at rest the aeaning white,
as the signification intended to be conveyed.* Quoted
























Ibid; of., A. d'Abro IvoluUon of aoi.nt tflo Thought
» 1927;, p. 368, reiark* that hw(Mew York! Dover,
no seane of dieoovering whether what one wan eeee aa
red the other might not see aa blua wara our obaervare
to exchange eyea and brains while retaining their memory
of paat aenaationa. On the other hand, we oan aaaert
from experience that, for normal human beings, two ob-
jects whioh appear to be of the same colour to one ob-
server will appear to be the same colour to the other. *
PI. 50.
BB. p. 138.
PX. 302; it ie noted in this little semi-dialogue whioh
followB that *A* mostly represents the views of Witt-




Sohliok, OP. cit . . pp. 181-68, from whioh the logio of






PI. 293; of., 396t **...if aa a matter of logio you
exclude other people's having something, it loses its
sense to say that you have it.*
PX. 304.
PI. 243; of., 398: *The very fact that we should so
much like to say: *Thie is the important thing*—while
we point privately to the sensation—is enough to show






PI. 316; the underlining is nine.
114. PI. 302.
1X6. PI. 123. I hays reversed the order in this quotation.
116. PI* 134.
117. PI. 364.














132. BB. p. 69.
133. PI. 376.
134. BB . p . 24 .
135. PI. 344, "Our criterion for soneone's saying soisething
to hinself is what he tells us and the rest of his be-
haviour; and we only say that eoseone speaks to hinself
if. In tb« ordinary sense of the words, he pan apeah *

































166. BB. p. 56.
166. PI. 218, "Whenoe oomss tba id«a that tha beginning of
a seriee is a ieible eeotion of rails inrUibly laid
to infinity? well, we night iaagine rails instead of
' a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the




This oonoXuslon it in two teotiona. In tha first (i),
I ahall giwa a ausunary of the prsoading four ohaptara. In
tha aaoond (ii) I ehaXl aaka four oonoXuding raaarka whiob I
baXiawa oan be made'^ fros tha major points dawaXopad in tha
body of this thasia.
(i) first ohaptar wae oonoarnad with dawaloping
tha idaaa of two idaaXistSi PXato and LaibniXi and two ampir-
ioiata, Looka and ausaaXX, aepaoiaXXy in so far as thasa idaaa
war# raXatad to tha oonnaotion between Xanguage and reality.
QanaraXXy, it waa found that both approaohaa uXtiaataXy arriwad
at a oonoapt of meaning whioh depended upon soma sort of pri-
ata entity (image) in tha mind. That is, each of tha above
phiXoaophars oonoXudad that tha meaning of a word waa deter-
mined by aoma kind of image whioh tha apeaker haXd in hia mind
whiXa ha waa apaaking. In oonsaquenoe of this standpoint thasa
phiXoaophars were moat often intaraetad in estabXishing tha
oonnaotion betwaen their postuXated entities and reality, and
aXao, between thoaa entities and Xanguaga.
Tha aaoond ohaptar daaXt primariXy with those probXams
that were incurred by the two approaohaa whan these thinkers
tried to eatabXiah the kind of raXationship that obtained be-
tween tha putative entity and tha reaX world; and also between
this image and Xcuiguage. It was shown that aaoh philosopher
ran up against tremendous diff iouXties, both XogioaXXy and
apiatamoXogioaXXy , as ha triad to astabXish soma sort of iso-
(X03)
sorphism b«twe«n theee h«terogen«ou0 ‘things*, knd also, that
both approaches isade It quits olsar that ths moaning of a word
(l.t. Its referent Image) was bounded on all sides by that
publloi*).y Inaooesslble medium: the phlloaopher's own mind.
AS a result of this, these attempts to ascertain the ontological
character
liHiHi^of reality and the structure of the real world by means
of an examination of language, were rendered futile, mostly
because no one could get at the Image whloh the philosopher
had *ln mind*.
In the third chapter, X tried to develop the ideas of
S
Ludwig Wittgenstein on private language. The purpose of thle
disquisition was to show that It Is both logically and splste-
mologloally Impossible to maintain that a private Image ^
the meaning for a given word. Moreover, this chapter pointed
out that on two grounds the Idea of a private language was Im-
possible. For, on the one hand, It was shown that the speaker
oould not be understood by others; and on the other hand, that
the speaker oould not be sure that he himself was using the
s.^e meaning (private Image) each time he used the same word.
In the fourth chapter, 1 proceeded to indicate just what
It was that Wittgenstein construed the "meaning* of a word
to be. Generally, It was ehown: (a) how the Idea of an Image
in the mind as the meaning for a word oame into being, and
this was demonstrated by what was called the substantive-
substance fallacy; (b) how a word does not oome about Its mean-
ing—In order to Indicate some of the reasons why a private
( 104 )
linguist would haws troublw in tsaohing *bis* word to othara;
(o) how one night oome about learning a word, with the awowed
realisation that the projected method wae only one of those
found in the works of Wittgenstein, and meant, in no way, to
be the way a word is learned; and finally (d) how one oomes
about a criterion whereby it oould be established that a word
purpose
had been learned by another person. The prinoipal;^afenaMi of
this chapter was to eluoidate how the meaning of a word is
its use in a language. This was the oonoept of meaning whioh
I felt Wittgenstein most earnestly propounded. Its oontin-
genoies were brought out in the course of the exposition, and
as a result of this, it was seen that many of the olassioal
probleouB oentering about that notion of meaning as a priwate
entity, were called into question.
(ii) Oonolmllng reaarltB—(a) I do not wl.h to oonolud. that
Plato, Leibnis, Locke and Bussell are completely wrong in their
dootrines relevant to the topic at issue. I do, however, cell
into serious qusstion that aspect of their philosophy, mostly
epistemologioal in nature, whioh seeks to interpret language
as being meaningful only when there is an image (private)
oonneoted to its word. Thus, I have merely tried to point
out where
.
in the light of this oommon epistemologioal prob*
lem, each of these philosophers has gone astray, and hOJL. in
the light of Wittgenstein’s remarks, the direction of their
views, in this above-mentioned, limited respect, oan be called
into serious question.
( 106 )
(b) Mor^ovtri support for prlrato languags •••us to
8tam aolnly fpo« antertaluing a oonoopt of moanlxig which is
chained to the idea of a subjectiwely perceived iaage« or
•eneation, or putative entity, as it has been varloualy teroed
in the above expoeltion.
(o) X alec conclude that the prliwiry interest of the
four philosophers fflentioned above, in regard to language, was
to develop a definite kind of relation between language and
reality aainly because they believed there to be soae kind
of oonneotion between the two. As was shown, their oonoem
produced a third "thing*, the putative entity, which was to
be the bond between language and reality. However, the idea
of meaning ae an image harbored in the mind of the speaker
(which grew out of this postulated entity) has been shown to
be no problem at all, ae there is actually no oonneotion be-
tween language and reality,
(d) Finally, X oonolude that Wittgenstein's notion of
"meaning" ae uee . substantially removes the problems which
surround the 'Imagiatio* concept of meaning. In fact, the full
force of Wittgenstein's argument has been directed towards the
dissolution of the idea that there is a oonneotion between
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